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Abstract
Chapter 1 exploits relative price shocks induced by the Indonesian financial crisis to demon-
strate a causal relationship between economic distress and religious intensity and investigate
why it exists. Rapid inflation favored growers of staple crops and disfavored sticky wage-
earners. I use pre-crisis wetland hectares and government occupation as instruments and dry-
land hectares and service occupation as "placebo instruments" to estimate the impact of eco-
nomic distress on religious intensity. Economic distress stimulates Koran study and Islamic
school attendance but does not stimulate other social activities or secular school attendance.
The results seem attributable to the role of religion as ex-post social insurance: credit avail-
ability reduces the effect of economic distress on religious intensity by roughly 80%, religious
intensity alleviates needing alms or credit to meet basic needs at the peak of the crisis, and
religious institutions facilitate consumption smoothing among villagers. I explain these findings
in a model where religious intensity represents the degree of social insurance in which people
participate and social sanctions facilitate religion's function as ex-post insurance. Together,
these results provide evidence that religious intensity responds to economic forces and suggest
alleviating risk may mitigate fundamentalist tendencies.
Chapter 2 exploits differences in religious intensity across Indonesia before and during the
Indonesian financial crisis to identify the effect of religious intensity on social violence. In high
religious intensity areas, violence is more likely to arise. Stronger measures of religious inten-
sity are more strongly associated with social violence. Social violence is negatively associated
with other social activities. These results are unlikely to be driven by omitted environmental
variables: social violence increases fastest where participation in Koran study also increases
the fastest, and this is not true for state or industrial violence. Religious intensity is more
strongly linked with social violence in regions that are more economically distressed. Credit
availability mitigates this effect. These results support the ex-post social insurance model of
religious intensity. High marginal utilities during economic distress increase incentives to enact
sanctions. With volatility, religions with harsher punishment or violence are more stable and
successful. As volatility declines, benign groups and religions become relatively successful.
Chapter 3 During the early 20th century, France initiated an unusual tax policy to promote
marriage and fertility, regressive in that fertility incentives were so large and greatest among
the rich. Eugenic interest in family allowances was substantial during this time due to fear
of depopulation and changing ratios of uneducated to educated. Family incomes were divided
by family size to determine a final tax bracket. A number of countries have begun promoting
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similar tax incentives. Economic theory is ambiguous as to what such incentives do. This paper
uses variation in tax policy with differential impact for different population groups to disentan-
gle economic incentives from propaganda that often accompany such country-wide initiatives.
Evidence using synthetic cohorts constructed from aggregate tax return data suggests a large
and significant elasticity of fertility and marriage with respect to tax incentives, which may
partly explain France's higher post-war fertility relative to other European countries.
Thesis Supervisor: Esther Duflo
Title: Professor of Economics
Thesis Supervisor: Joshua Angrist
Title: Professor of Economics
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Chapter 1
Economic Distress and Religious
Intensity: Evidence from Islamic
Resurgence During the Indonesian
Financial Crisis
1.1 Introduction
Despite an explosion in policy interest in association with recent events, religious intensity
appears to be poorly understood. Is there a causal relationship between economic distress and
religious intensity? If so, why? Does religious intensity function as ex-post social insurance?
Social scientists have long speculated on the connection between economic forces and religious
intensity. Answers to questions such as these may suggest appropriate policies to address
ideological extremism.
This paper uses the Indonesian financial crisis to estimate the causal impact of economic
distress on Koran study (Pengajian) and Islamic school attendance and provides evidence sug-
gesting religious intensity functions as social insurance. Between 1997 and 1998, Indonesia's
Rupiah fell dramatically from 2400 to the US dollar to 16000 to the US dollar and the CPI for
food increased from 100 to 261. My research design exploits the fact that relative prices shocks
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induced by the crisis favored growers of staples, namely rice, and hurt sticky wage-earners,
particularly government employees whose salaries are set by federal law. Because wetland
hectares and government occupation are unlikely to be correlated with changes in religious in-
tensity other than through economic distress, the interaction of the crisis and wetland hectares
and the interaction of the crisis and government occupation creates exogenous variation in eco-
nomic distress that can be used to estimate the causal impact of economic distress on religious
intensity. Dryland hectares and service occupation serve as "placebo instruments" to test
whether unobservables common with wetland and dryland hectares and with government and
service occupations influence changes in religious intensity.
In the following sections, I present an analysis of data from the Hundred Villages Survey, a
panel of 8,140 households, conducted by the Indonesian Census Bureau. Section 2 presents a
model of religious intensity functioning as ex-post social insurance. Agents choose a proportion
of income to put in Pengajian, a risk-sharing pool. This proportion represents their religious
intensity. The pool is divided according to how much agents contribute as a fraction of their
income, i.e. their relative religious intensity. The model has the empirical implications that
those who are hit harder by economic distress will increase their religious intensity and those
who are hit less hard will decrease their religious intensity. The effect should be mitigated
when other forms of credit are available. Social sanctions against relative lack of intensity
facilitate the stability of ex-post insurance by deterring agents who receive positive shocks from
leaving, which in turn encourages agents who receive negative shocks to stay because they can
appropriate more of the positive shocks.
Section 3 establishes wetland hectares and government occupation are indeed related to
economic distress during the crisis. The price of rice increased by up to 280% while in compar-
ison, prices of non-staples increased by less or even fell during the crisis (Levinsohn et.al 2003).
Therefore, the more wetland a household owns, the smaller the decrease in non-food expendi-
ture. In contrast, real wages fell on the order of 40% (Smith et.al 2002), so households headed
by a government employee, whose salaries tend to be inflexible in the short run (Knowles et.al
1999), report larger decreases in non-food expenditure.
The variety of evidence presented in Section 3 establishes that the financial crisis differ-
entially impacted wetland owners and government employees during the crisis. In Section 4,
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I consider whether households suffering greater economic distress increase religious intensity.
Two-stage least squares estimates using this variation suggests that households who suffer more
economic distress significantly increase religious intensity while those who suffer less economic
distress significantly decrease religious intensity relative to other households. The estimates
indicate that households who suffer a $1 decline in monthly non-food per-capita expenditures
are roughly 2% more likely to increase Koran study. The average household suffered a $4.70
decline in monthly non-food per-capita expenditures.
I also look at the effect of economic distress on the number of children that households
send to Islamic schools as an alternative measure of religious intensity. In spite of the fact
that Islamic schools in my sample are substantially more expensive than non-Islamic schools,
Islamic school attendance of affected households increase relative to the attendance of less
affected households. This effect is not observed for secular school attendance. Since a priori it
seems non-economically rational to send children during economic distress to more expensive
schools with lower returns to education (Berman and Stepanyan 2003), these results support
the view that a strong form of religious intensity, not merely religious activity, is being captured
by the Pengajian estimates.
I then explore why economic distress stimulates religious intensity. I first show that eco-
nomic distress does not stimulate participation in other social activities. To shed further light
on whether Koran study is merely a leisure activity and households have more leisure, I in-
vestigate the effect of economic distress on labor supply. Households suffering more economic
distress work slightly more hours per week. These results seem inconsistent with opportunity
cost of time models of religion (Azzi and Ehrenberg 1975, Gruber 2003a) since falling wages do
not increase participation in other social activities and households have less time for religious
activity.
In Section 5, I turn to the evidence for religious intensity as a form of social insurance.
Religious intensity during the peak of the crisis appears to alleviate the need for alms or credit
in order to meet basic daily needs. Households that increase participation in Koran study
during the crisis see a 50% reduction in likelihood to need alms or credit three months later
whereas households that decrease participation see a 20% reduction in likelihood to need alms
or credit three months later. Those who did not participate are only 5% less likely to need
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alms or credit three months later. Religious institutions also appear to facilitate consumption
smoothing among villagers as measured by the standard deviation of consumption shocks in a
village.
Importantly, the effect of economic distress on religious intensity essentially disappears in
places where credit is available in the form of banks, microfinance institutions, or BRI loan
products. The role of religion as a provider of insurance is broadly consistent with club
goods theory (Buchanan 1965, Scotchmer 2002, Iannacone 1992, Berman 2000), which posits
the existence of local public goods, such as mutual insurance that is excludable to non-group
members.
Chapter 2 examines the relationship between religious intensity and communal violence
using the Database on Social Violence in Indonesia 1990-2001. Religious intensity causes more
social violence in regions that are more economically distressed. Alternative social insurance
mitigates this effect.
Religious intensity provides a particularly apt context to study group identity as it is more
of a choice than ethnicity. Several authors have found significantly negative impacts of ethnic-
religious conflicts on economic outcomes (e.g. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2002) and Alesina,
et.al (1999)). The opposite direction of causality has also begun to attract attention and
spark debate (e.g. Wolfensohn (2003) vs. Krueger and Maleckova (2002) on whether economic
conditions cause terrorism). 1 These results suggest, to the extent governments, international
organizations, and NGOs are concerned about ideological extremism, increasing the provision
of social insurance may mitigate fundamentalist tendencies.
1This paper also contributes to the literature on the determinants of religion, which has received a recent
boost with the work of Barro and McCleary (2002), Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001), and Gruber (2003a, 2003b)
and the literature on consumption smoothing (households can smooth through borrowing and lending, through
storage, through transfers in family networks, or through religious participation) and insurance (Townsend 1994).
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1.2 Religion and Economics in Indonesia
1.2.1 Background 2
87% of Indonesia's population of 230 million is Muslim, which makes it the country with the
largest Muslim population in the world. The primary measure of religious intensity being
studied is Pengajian, which specifically refers to Koran study. 61% of households in my sample
report participating in Pengajian in August 1998 which increases to 71% in August 1999.
In most Islamic denominations, the Koran is kept in its strictest form, meaning that it
cannot be translated. For Pengajian, usually a group gathers to read the Koran together in
Arabic, discussing both the translation and the meaning. Sometimes, a leader or imam will be
responsible for translating and applying the Koran to the real world in a lecture format. Lessons
on how to live and perspectives on contemporary events are common material for discussion.
The particular interpretation depends on the type of Islam-modern, radical, democratic, liberal,
or "abangan". Pengajian usually meet once a week but may meet more often depending on
demand. Pengajian is more than just praying-participants believe they are learning more deeply
from the Koran although some people may attend Pengajian just to show they are religious
or avoid shame from their neighborhood. Pengajian can sometimes become politicized though
it tends to be more concerned with general religious and social doctrine rather than specific
political problems (Geertz 1960 p.168-9).
Geertz writes on one Pengajian meeting: During most of two hours, a speaker exhorts on
the importance of attending and organizing, ridiculing those who only sit and pray, thinking
about the next world and doing nothing else: "The Prophet not only prayed but prayed and
acted." Sloppy dress is criticized as are civil servants who think they are better than everyone
else and people who worship stone and wood. Moral maxims, dramatized in pantomime, are
strung together like 'daisies on a chain' with no organization or direction, yet still marvelously
well done. Geertz concludes, Pengajian tends to be a kind of rally, where speakers exhort
listeners in the most general terms to rouse up and do something.
The typical number of participants depends on village size and number of Muslims and
2The information in this section, except what is cited from Geertz, is generously provided by
Prima Fortunadewi and Julius Kusuma, who translated the survey.
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imams. Pengajian for children and teenagers usually number around 25-50 people. A separate
Pengajian exists for children to teach them how to read Koran. Not every Muslim knows how
to read Arabic nor does every participant need to be able to read Arabic since participants will
be taught Arabic if necessary. Men and women may attend Pengajian together although there
is typically a separate layer between them; women who are having their period are not allowed
to attend.
Donations to the mosque typically occur during Pengajian, but Pengajians can be held in
any public or private space. Donations can be used to build new mosques, upkeep current
mosques, and pay salaries. Sometimes if people are particularly in need, people will give them
money.
There is some qualitative evidence that religion provides social insurance in other countries.
Berman (2000) argues the degree of mutual insurance (in the Ultra-Orthodox sect in Israel)
probably exceeds that of traditional Indian villages studied by Townsend (1994). Berman
writes, citing Landau (1993), that no sick members are without visitors and that free services
for burial, mothers after childbirth, and the elderly as well as interest-free loans from hundreds
to thousands of dollars are ubiquitous. The only condition is that members donate time and
money. In a town near Accra in Ghana, a catechist s states that when any church member
falls ill, the others contribute to a fund and the money is given to the sick. Similarly, when a
church member dies, money is collected and given to the family members of the dead. These
services are not available if you leave the church or go and join another church. Women may
even expect to receive money from their church for newborn children. That religion provides
transfers for consumption is a hypothesis suggested by the qualitative evidence that will be
tested quantitatively in Section 5.
1.2.2 Model
In the following sections, I present a model in which religious intensity functions as ex-post
social insurance motivated in part by the previous discussion. Religious intensity represents
the degree to which someone participates in social insurance. Religion is able to provide ex-post
insurance (insurance after some but not all information is revealed) because social sanctions
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3I thank Zaki Wahhaj for these observations.
overcome the individual rationality constraints that would otherwise prevent ex-post insurance
groups from forming. The model builds on the work of Iannaccone (1992) and Berman (2000),
who theorize that religion provides local public goods such as mutual insurance. They formalize
the important insight that religion requires outward displays of religious intensity and sacrifice
as a tax on non-religious activities. The tax on alternative activities induces members to
contribute more to the provision of local public goods. Displays of religious intensity and
sacrifice also screen out potential free-riders of the local public goods, which have positive
externalities for other group members.
The formulation below provides microfoundations for the provision of mutual insurance
and highlights what makes ex-post social insurance self-sustaining. In addition to Iannaccone
(1992) and Berman (2000), it also follows the work of Coate and Ravallion (1993), Kocherlakota
(1996), Alvarez and Jermann (2000), Krueger and Perri (2002), and Genicot and Ray (2003):
religion exists to help complete a missing market for credit. In these models, social insurance
is self-sustaining because people are punished with permanent autarky if they choose to defect.
I instead model religion as a risk-sharing mechanism where people can increase or decrease
their religious intensity (participation in mutual insurance) at any time. I focus on the ex-post
nature to the participation in mutual insurance. I also depart from the literature by modelling
the participation in risk-sharing as a continuous decision (degree of participation) rather than
a binary one (participate or not).
People pool their resources and redistribute the resource pool according to each participant's
relative religious intensity. The model has the empirical implications that those who are hit
harder by economic distress will increase their religious intensity and those who are hit less
hard will decrease their religious intensity. The effect should be mitigated when other forms
of credit or insurance are available.
The model is as follows. Agents receive a high or low shock (independently and identically
distributed). After the shock is realized, agents choose religious intensity to smooth consump-
tion ex-post. Agents choose a fraction of money to put in Pengajian and the rest to keep for
themselves. The fraction put in Pengajian denotes an agent's religious intensity. The Pengajian
budget is immediately divided according to agents' relative religious intensities. For example,
if someone contributes 5% of his income to the pool and another person contributes 10% of his
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income to the pool, the second person will receive twice the share of the pool as the first person
(even if the second person is poorer) because the second person is considered twice as religious
as the first.
Because religious intensity can be chosen after agents realize their income shock, religious
intensity functions as ex-post insurance. Most financial institutions only provide ex-ante in-
surance because there is no way to compel agents to donate after a positive shock. Hence,
for ex-post insurance to be possible there must be something that deters agents from pulling
out, which in turn encourages agents who receive negative shocks to stay in because they can
appropriate more of the positive shocks. A strong form of social sanction towards those who
are of another religious organization or less religiously intense, provided in the doctrine of many
religions, facilitates religion's function as ex-post insurance by deterring people who receive pos-
itive shocks from leaving. Mutual insurance groups without social sanctions such as rotating
savings groups will be less stable.
1.2.3 Basic Assumptions
Agents receive a shock (L < H):
H with probability 
X-
L with probability 
There is a continuum of agents of unit measure. Agent have only one decision to make: the level
of religious intensity Q E [0,1] after the shock x is realized. Religious intensity Q represents the
fraction of income agents put in Pengajian, 1 - Q represents the fraction agents keep separate
from the risk-sharing pool. Agents divide the Pengajian budget in a manner proportionate
to their relative religious intensity, which is Q/Q where Q denotes average religious intensity.
Note that agents do not receive the same amount they put in: agents who receive negative
shocks will get money from agents who receive positive shocks even if their religious intensities
are the same.
Since agents who receive positive shocks would otherwise leave, social sanction V(.) ensures
the stability of ex-post insurance. Social sanctions are greater for those who participate less
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and is captured by V() if Q < Q and V(.) = 0 if Q > Q (the religiously intense do not
sanction themselves). Since displaying religious intensity involves attendance, I model the cost
of displaying religious intensity with C(Q), which is convex.4 I assume V(.) and C(.) are
smooth functions and such that optimal Q is never 1 or 0.5
Utility u(.) is a standard increasing concave function of income. Let Q, denote the choice
of religious intensity, where x can be H or L. Let hi be the Pengajian budget. The payoff to
an agent who realizes x is:
UX = U[(1- Q)x+- () - -V( )- C(Q) (1.1)
From the setup it follows that the Pengajian budget is T = ½(HQH + LQL) and average
religious intensity is Q = ½(QH + QL). For shorthand, I will call an agent who receives a
high shock by H and an agent who receives a low shock by L. Agents take into account how
the decision of others affects the Pengajian budget hi and optimize their religious intensity by
equating marginal benefits to marginal costs in equation 1.1.
It can be immediately observed that agent L chooses a higher level of religious intensity
than agent H, Q* > Q*. The intuition is simply that the higher is QH the less agent H gets,
whereas for agent L, the higher is QL the more he gets.
It is important to observe that H's religious intensity is, in a sense, complementary for L's
religious intensity: those who are more religiously intense prefer others to be religiously intense
as well in order to appropriate their high income draw: this captures the local public goods
aspect of club goods theory (Buchanan 1965). Therefore, for L, there are positive externalities
from others' participation.
However, those who are less religiously intense prefer others to be less religiously intense to
prevent appropriation of their high income draw and also to decrease social sanctions. So for
H, there are negative externalities from others' participation.
4The cost function prevents a corner solution where those who receive L choose maximum intensity.




I now consider what happens during a crisis. Those who realize a high income shock relative to
others will decrease their religious intensity while those who realize a low income shock relative
to others will increase their religious intensity. Social sanctions facilitate the stability of ex-
post insurance by deterring those who receive positive shocks from pulling out, which in turn
encourages those who receive negative shocks to stay in because they can appropriate more of
the positive shocks.
Proposition 1: Suppose income x drops by a large number M. Then the dispersion of
religious intensity increases. M (Q*) > O. Social sanction V(.) facilitates the stability of ex-
post insurance. During crisis, groups without strong punishment will decline in participation.
The intuition behind this result is as income x falls, the marginal utility increases, which
tends to increase L's desire for consumption smoothing but tends to increase H's desire to keep
money for himself.
This result does not depend on H and L falling by the same amount M. The result
holds as long as the crisis weakly increases the spread between positive and negative shocks.
The data suggests this is in fact the case: the sample mean of village standard deviation of
consumption shocks is much higher during the crisis than during a non-crisis period. (Section
10, the consumption smoothing appendix, describes how these variables are constructed.) A
weakly increasing spread, (H - L), reinforces L's desire for consumption smoothing and H's
desire to keep money for himself.
Mutual insurance groups may vary in degree of social sanctions against reducing participa-
tion or against non-group members. For instance, religious doctrine is missing in groups such
as rotating savings clubs. Without punishment for relative lack of intensity, H will decline in
religious intensity. If H declines in intensity, then L will decline in intensity as well because
the less H participates, the smaller is the Pengajian budget. Since both Q* and Q* tend to
fall, this means insurance schemes without a strong form of social sanction, such as rotating
savings groups, may tend to fail during crisis. Moreover, there should be no relative change in
participation intensity in rotating savings groups for those who realize a low income shock vs.
those who realize a high income shock.
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Note that if mutual insurance is less efficient, less is gained from decreasing intensity by H
and less is gained from increasing intensity by L. Economic distress should not be expected to
stimulate other social activities that provide little mutual insurance.
Proofs are in the mathematical appendix.
1.2.5 Credit Availability
I now consider what happens when credit is available. Credit institutions allow households to
smooth across time, making religious intensity less necessary since it serves to smooth across
space (i.e. people).
For simplicity, I assume an infinite-horizon model. The infinite-horizon model without credit
gives the same comparative statics (Proposition 1) as the one-period setup since agents solve
the identical maximization problem in each period. To more starkly illustrate the intuition, I
also assume credit is costless, although the discussion below will make clear it is only necessary
that credit availability induces a discrete reduction in the marginal cost of credit.
Proposition 2: If alternative credit is available, religious intensity does not need to increase.
Credit availability reduces Q* more than it reduces Q* so that M ( Q- ) Credit < M (Q--) NoCredit
The intuition is that credit availability allows agents to smooth intertemporally by them-
selves and achieve their Pareto frontier. Smoothing via religious intensity, on the other hand,
is constrained according to how much others contribute to hi and also entails cost C(.). Since
u(.) is concave, L's marginal utility is high so credit matters more for L than for H, which
is why Q. falls further than Q* when credit is available. Convex costs, C(.), reinforces L's
desire to decrease religious intensity Q* more than H decreases Q* when credit is available.
In reality, the marginal cost of credit may vary and be greater than the marginal cost of
Pengajian, in which case credit availability may not affect religious intensity. The appropriate
interpretation of credit availability then is a discrete reduction in the marginal cost of credit (or
interest rate), which, all else equal, tends to decrease Q. (and would never increase Q). As
long as the marginal cost of credit is increasing, Q* and Q* will not go to zero. For example,
if agents cannot borrow the large amount necessary in one period for whatever reason, then
Pengajian picks up the slack.
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I have assumed the mosque does not provide intertemporal smoothing; I only model inter-
spatial smoothing among agents. Religious groups may also have outside resources that they
transfer to individuals with greater religious intensity. I also do not consider agents smoothing
from a buffer-stock of wealth. Even if these means of intertemporal smoothing are available,
it should not affect the comparative statics on credit availability, which should then be inter-
preted as a discrete reduction in the interest rate. The other comparative statics should also
be unaffected.
1.2.6 Sunummary
To summarize, the model has the following empirical predictions.
* Economic distress stimulates religious intensity; positive shocks reduce religious intensity.
* One falsification test of the effect of economic distress on religious intensity is whether
economic distress stimulates participation in other social activities that provide less social
insurance.
* Credit availability reduces the effect of economic distress on religious intensity.
* Participation in mutual insurance groups without strong social sanctions will decline
during crisis.
1.3 Design of Study
1.3.1 Data
The empirical analysis draws from The Hundred Villages Survey, collected by the Indonesian
Central Statistics Office. The panel dataset follows 8,140 households from May 1997 to August
1999, beginning before the crisis and continuing in four waves after the crisis (Figure 1). Re-
ligious intensity is measured using the response to "In the past 3 months, has your household
increased, decreased, stayed the same, or not participated in the study of Koran (Pengajian)?"
This question is asked after the crisis and is coded as +1/0/-1. Non-participation is coded
along with staying the same as 0. In some specifications I will also code separately increase
vs. stay the same or decrease and decrease vs. stay the same or increase.
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To verify Pengajian actually measures religious intensity, I examine the correlation between
Pengajian and other measures of religious intensity and the correlation between these measures
conditional on household characteristics and village fixed effects. Pengajian participation in
August 1998 is conditionally correlated with number of children attending Islamic school at
0.043 with 5% significance. Pengajian is conditionally correlated with the number of adults who
attended Islamic school as children at 0.071 with 1% significance. Pengajian is conditionally
correlated with owning a Koran at 0.126 with 1% significance. Pengajian is conditionally
correlated with worshipping in December 1998 at 0.192 with 1% significance.
To further verify Pengajian and Islamic school attendance capture religious intensity po-
tentially associated with belief6 in a literal interpretation of a religious text, I correlate Islamic
school attendance with measures of beliefs in IFLS2 (Indonesian Family Life Survey). Whether
a household has ever sent a child to Islamic school is correlated with fatalism in desired number
of sons at 0.051 with 10% significance. Whether a household has ever sent a child to Islamic
school is correlated with religious contraception opposition at 0.089 with 5% significance.7
Chapter 2 examines the relationship between religious intensity measures in the Hundred
Villages Survey with communal violence in the Database on Social Violence in Indonesia 1990-
2001.
The measure of economic distress I focus on is change in monthly per-capita nonfood con-
sumption expenditures. Change in total per-capita consumption expenditures is a poorer mea-
sure of distress because landowners may not need to pay market prices on food. For example,
wetland owners may substitute towards consuming privately-grown agricultural products. In
fact, wetland owners have larger than average decreases in total consumption expenditures even
though they have smaller than average decreases in nonfood expenditures. Government workers
have larger decreases in nonfood expenditures as well as total expenditures. The results are
also qualitatively the same using the US/Rupiah exchange rate to normalize to dollars or with
using a CPI index. The dataset and remaining variable construction is described in greater
6Pengajian may be a better measure of religious intensity than answers from questions on attitude or belief.
Answers to those questions may suffer from cognitive bias with unknown error distribution that may make causal
interpretation difficult (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001, Greenwald et.al. 1995).
7Fatalism is a dummy for answering, "It is up to God," in response to "What is your ideal number of sons?"
The answer, "It is up to God" is not prompted. Religious contraception opposition is a dummy for answering,
without prompting, religious reasons for "Why do you not use contraception?"
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detail in the data appendix.
It is important to note that the measure for change in religious intensity comes from August
1998 and the Pengajian question refers to the past 3 months, whereas the measure for income
shock comes from differencing expenditures in August 1998 and May 1997 (See Figure 1).
However, as the time-series in Figure 1 suggests, half of the sharp increase in Rp/USD occurs
in the 3 months before August 1998. The CPI index for foodstuff also sharply increases
relative to the general CPI index during this time period. Therefore, the way wetland owners
and government workers are disproportionately affected by the relative price shocks should still
apply for that 3 month period. The goal is to get a proxy for economic distress. If preferred,
one can scale up the coefficients by a factor of two.
1.3.2 Identification Strategy and Specifications
The correlation between economic variables and religious intensity is generally difficult to in-
terpret since the causality may run in both directions and the relationship may reflect omitted
variables. For example, the religiously fervent may eschew adopting advantageous technologies
because of views such as "why vaccinate the cow, the cow's life is in God's hands" .8 I therefore
use the financial crisis to identify a discontinuous change in economic conditions.
Consider the following linear specification for latent religiosity:
Q*t = fEijt + aot + aitXij + jt + ui + ijt, for t = 1,2, i = 1..N, and j = 1..J (1.2)
where Qijt represents religious intensity for individual i in village j at time t, Eijt represents
monthly per-capita non-food expenditures, Xij represents a set of pre-crisis control variables
(household head characteristics: age, education, gender, ever-married, literate, follows media
(TV or radio) and household characteristics: size, modernity (index of owning a stove, radio,
TV, refrigerator, satellite dish, motorbike, and car), farming dummy, service dummy, hectares
of dryland owned, and pre-crisis monthly per-capita non-food expenditures)9 , 5ijt represents
8Heard in Kenya.
gConstruction of these variables is described in the data appendix.
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village time fixed effects, and ui represents household fixed effects. The subscript t on alt
allows the effect of pre-crisis control variables Xij to vary over time.
Taking first differences results in:
AQij = 3AEij + (a02 - aol01) + (a12 - all)Xij + yj + wij, for i = 1..N and j = 1..J
where AQi
~
represents changes in religious intensity for individual i in village j, AEij represents
changes in monthly per-capita non-food expenditures, Yj = 62 - 6jl represents village fixed
effects, and wij = ij 2 - ijl
In practice, AQi; is unobserved. Instead, I observe AQij, which denotes increase, decrease,
or no change in Koran study. In particular, I first estimate the linear probability specification:
AQij = 3AEij + c + a'Xij + j + eij (1.3)
where AQij represents changes in Koran study for individual i in village j, -yj represent village
fixed effects, and c is a constant. Because AQij has the following ordered structure:
-1 if AQ < l
AQij= 0 if A1 < AQj'-< • 2
1 if AQj >- 2
I will also estimate the following ordered probit specification to test whether economic distress
stimulates religious intensity:
Pr(AQij = - ) = Fwi(pl - 3AEij - (a02 - ao01) -(a12 - ll)Xij - yjIij)
Pr(A\Qij = Ii;) = Fwij(p2 - 3AEij - (a02 - ao01) - (a12 - al)Xij - 7jllij) -
Fwij(Pl- 3AEij - (aO2 - ao01) - (a12 - Cell)tXij - 7jlij)
Pr(AQij = 1Ij) = 1 - FWi(2 - AEij - (ao2 - ao01) - (a2 - all)'Xij - jIij)
where Iij = (1, Xij, -yj) and Fwij(.Iijt) is normal. Equation 1.3 is the linear approximation of
the ordered probit specification. I will estimate linear probability, ordered probit, and probit
specifications (when comparing only increase vs. stay the same or decrease and decrease vs.
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stay the same or increase).
Table 4 Columns 1-2 presents OLS estimates of equation 1.3. However, the OLS regression
of this implicit individual fixed effects specification is still insufficient. Omitted variables bias
makes the estimates difficult to interpret. Moreover, measurement error in expenditures, which
may be exacerbated in differences, biases OLS estimates towards 0.10
To identify the causal impact of economic distress, I exploit the fact that during a period of
rapid inflation, demand for non-staples tends to fall more than demand for staples, so relative
prices favor staple growers. The price of rice increased by up to 280% while in comparison,
prices of non-staples increased by less or even depreciated during the crisis (Levinsohn et.al
2003). The more rice a household grows, the more cushioned it would be from the crisis.
Therefore, the amount of wetland a household owns should be expected to cushion it from
economic distress.
In addition, rapid inflation also tends to disproportionately affect workers with sticky wages.
In particular, government workers, whose wages are set by federal law, are likely to suffer greater
economic distress. These relationships have been already documented by earlier studies of the
Indonesian financial crisis: Knowles et.al (1999), Frankenberg et.al (1999), and Levinsohn et.al
(2003), to name a few of many studies.
The first stage regression is:
AEij = 7ro + r'l Zij + r'2X3j + Pj (1.4)
where Zij represents the instruments, pre-crisis hectares of wetland owned and pre-crisis gov-
ernment occupation dummy for individual i in village j. The corresponding reduced form
regression is:
AQjj = 3'Zij + c + a'Xij + 7j + eij (1.5)
The identification assumption is E(eijZij) = 0. Robustness checks of the identification assump-
tion are provided in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
0l°In fact, the first row in Table 6 indicates the OLS estimates for almost every social activity are not statistically
different from 0, suggesting measurement error in expenditures may be a problem.
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The basic idea behind the identification strategy can be illustrated in a differences-in-
differences framework. In Table 1, I present summary statistics by group that illustrate the
identification strategy. The results are imprecise, due to the fact that only a small part of
the available information is used. Columns 1 and 2 show the mean monthly per-capita non-
food expenditure before and after the crisis for different categories of wetland hectares (greater
than or less than 0.3 hectares) and whether or not the household head works in government.
Columns 3-5 show for each category of wetland and government occupation the means of changes
in monthly per-capita non-food expenditure, Pengajian participation, and non-religious social
activities participation. Two important features of the data can be observed. First, house-
holds owning more wetland-who, on average, suffered less economic distress-tend to decrease
in Pengajian relative to other households. Second, households in government occupation-who,
on average, suffered greater economic distress-tend to increase in Pengajian relative to other
households. Column 5 shows the same pattern is not true for non-religious social activities.
The Wald estimate (an imprecise instrumental variables estimator) of the impact of economic
distress on religious intensity is the ratio of Pengajian change and economic distress and can
be obtained by dividing-0.022 by 1.4 (-0.016) or 0.068 by -4.8 (-0.014).
1.3.3 First Stage: Relative Price Shocks and Differential Impact of Financial
Crisis
Table 2 documents the relationship between wetland hectares and per-capita nonfood expendi-
ture changes during the crisis using the specification in equation 1.4. On average, an additional
hectare of wetland corresponds to a $1.13 smaller decrease in per-capita nonfood expenditures
relative to other households (Column 5). Being in government corresponds to roughly $2.04
larger decrease in per-capita nonfood expenditures relative to other households (Column 5).
The relationship holds with and without controlling for household characteristics and village
fixed effects (Columns 1-4). These results corroborate earlier findings by Frankenberg et.al
(1999) and Levinsohn et.al (2003) who find that those who were able to grow rice were less
affected by the crisis as rice prices and spending on rice dramatically increased. The results
also corroborate findings by Knowles et.al (1999) that indicate government workers were more
affected by the crisis as their salaries tend to be inflexible in the short run.
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Column 6 displays similar results when examining percentage changes in per-capita nonfood
expenditures. For example, dividing the government expenditure change, $2.04, by the baseline,
$12.9 (indicated in Column 1 of Table 1) gives roughly a 15% decline, the same percentage
decline indicated in Column 6 in Table 2. Changes in log expenditures however, do not give
a statistically significant first stage for wetland. Frankenberg et.al examine changes in log
expenditures using the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS2+) and find those whose main
activity is agriculture were relatively better off. It is possible that the poor, who often do not
collect wages in developing countries, report much poorly measured expenditure numbers. This
non-classical measurement error may bias estimates using logs, which emphasize the poorer part
of the distribution more. One must also remain agnostic about exactly which form of economic
distress stimulates religious intensity. Without additional instruments it is not possible to
isolate the potentially different effects of actual changes (sticker shock) vs. percentage changes
(relative changes) or per-capita changes vs. overall changes, etc.
1.4 Estimating the Impact of Economic Distress on Religious
Intensity
1.4.1 Reduced Form Evidence
Do those who experience larger negative shocks relative to others increase their religious in-
tensity? To examine whether wetland owners are less likely to increase religious intensity and
whether government workers are more likely to increase religious intensity, I estimate equation
1.5. Panel A in Table 3 shows the main experiment. On average, a hectare of wetland is
associated with 2% greater likelihood of decreasing Pengajian whereas government occupation
is associated with 6% greater likelihood of increasing Pengajian (Columns 1 and 3), indicating
that positive shocks appear to reduce religious intensity and negative shocks appear to increase
religious intensity. This relationship holds controlling for household characteristics and village
fixed effects (Columns 2 and 4).
Column 5 displays the joint estimation and Column 6 displays the overall ordered probit
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marginal effect." The estimates of marginal effects in Column 6 are very similar to the OLS
estimates in Column 5. I then compute the probit marginal effect for increasing (+1 vs. 0/-1)
in Column 7 and the probit marginal effect for decreasing (-1 vs. 0/+1) in Column 8. The
difference between the marginal effects in Column 7 and the marginal effects in Column 8 are
very similar to the OLS estimates in Column 5. Moreover, Columns 7 and 8 reveal that those
who realize a high income shock relative to others decrease their religious intensity during crisis
while those who realize a low income shock relative to others increase their religious intensity
during crisis, as Proposition 1 suggests.
It is not clear whether Pengajian increases reflect changes on the intensive or extensive
margin since pre-crisis Pengajian information is unavailable. One can make the rough assump-
tion that pre-crisis households participate in Pengajian if any adult or child attend Islamic
school. Under this assumption, government workers appear to have joined Pengajian studies
while wetland hectares is associated with decreasing pre-existing Pengajian studies.
1.4.2 Placebo Experiment
In examining the causal impact of economics on religion, one identifying assumption is that
religious organizations do not manipulate economic conditions for their advantage. Here, it
is reasonable to think that imams do not dictate economic policy nor was the financial crisis
an anticipation or consequence of religious fervor. However, several possibilities still threaten
the identification assumption. The most important potential problem is that the instruments,
wetland hectares and government occupation, may be correlated with omitted factors that
drive changes in religious intensity. To test this possibility, I use dryland hectares12 and
service occupation as "placebo instruments" for wetland hectares and government occupation.
Since dryland owners may share unobservable characteristics with wetland owners, and service
workers may share unobservable characteristics with government workers, these serve as a check
of the identification assumption. For example, wetland and dryland hectares are both strongly
associated with larger family sizes and having fewer modern amenities. Government and service
"The overall marginal effect is calculated by the following derivation: E(ylx) = P(y = 1x) - P(y =
-11x) since E(ylx) = E(y = )P(y = 11x)+E(y = O)P(y = OIxt)+E(y = -1)P(y - Ix) = P(y = 1)-P(y =
-11x).
12 Other crops grown in Indonesia include corn, cassava, sweet potatoes, peanuts, and soybeans.
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workers are significantly more likely to have graduated with 8 or more years of education, be
able to read and write, and follow radio or newspapers. There is also no consistent pattern on
whether government workers are more extreme than service workers relative to other households
along observed household head and household characteristics or vice versa (the same is true for
wetland and dryland ownership). The relative price of rice increased much more than relative
prices of other food items (Levinsohn et.al 2003) and service workers have more flexible wages
than government workers, so they should be less affected by economic distress.
The pattern of economic distress is in fact much less pronounced for dryland hectares and
service occupation. I estimate equation 1.4 for the "placebo instruments". An additional hectare
of dryland mitigates the decrease in per-capita nonfood expenditures by $0.39 (Column 7 of
Table 2), about a third of the effect ($1.13) of an additional hectare of wetland owned (Column
5). Service workers are associated with much smaller and statistically insignificant $0.19 smaller
declines in per-capita nonfood expenditures, while government workers are associated with a
$2.04 larger decline (Columns 7 and 5).
Panel B of Table 3 displays the reduced form relationship, specified in equation 1.5, between
the "placebo instruments" and Pengajian change during the crisis. The relationship between
religious intensity changes and the "placebos" is almost nil in all specifications. Comparing the
coefficients in Column 5 for the true instruments vs. the "placebo instruments" in Panels A
and B makes this contrast apparent.
I also check whether the treatment and control groups differ in religious intensity prior to
the crisis by examining whether pre-crisis religious intensity is conditionally orthogonal to the
instruments. Appendix Table B display the results for conditional orthogonality between pre-
crisis religious intensity and the instruments. Each cell represents a separate OLS regression
of the corresponding measure of religious intensity (described in the data appendix) on each
instrument, hectares of wetland owned, hectares of dryland owned, government occupation
dummy, and service occupation dummy. All regressions are run at the individual level. Village
religious intensity regressions control for clustering at the village level. The estimates suggest
land ownership is slightly positively correlated with pre-treatment household religious intensity
and government and service occupations are slightly negatively correlated with pre-treatment
household religious intensity. There does not appear to be a consistent pattern between the
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instruments and village religious intensity. To the extent pre-crisis religiosity may drive changes
in religious intensity during the crisis, that the "placebo instruments", dryland hectares and
service occupation, are much more correlated with pre-treatment household religious intensity
than are the true instruments, suggest these "placebos" are a good choice.
1.4.3 Post Experiment
Wetland hectares and government occupation may also be associated with differential trends in
religious intensity and economic change that coincide with the financial crisis. To explore
whether the differential changes in religious intensity reflect differential trends, I examine
whether one year after the crisis, between two periods without a crisis, the instruments are
associated with either economic distress or changes in religious intensity. I use the change in
Pengajian recorded in May 199913 and the difference between expenditures in May 1999 and
December 1998. As can be seen in Figure 1, this period forms a natural control experiment
since the Rp/USD exchange rate moves little.
If the crisis was indeed responsible for the differential performance of government workers
and wetland owners, one should not expect the same pattern of economic distress a year after
the crisis. I estimate equation 1.4 for this period after the crisis using the same pre-crisis
controls. Wetland hectares are associated with a statistically insignificant $0.32 relative decline
(Column 8 of Table 2) compared to $1.13 relative improvement during the crisis (Column 5).
Government workers actually display a reverse pattern of distress as households recover from
the financial crisis relative to others. They are associated with a $3.38 relative improvement
compared to other households (Columns 8 and 5). Note that this does not necessarily imply
government workers are recovering to pre-crisis levels. Their average monthly per-capita non-
food expenditure in May 1999 is 8.3 compared to 12.9 in May 1997. Nor, are households as
a whole recovering completely from the crisis. The crisis summary statistics at the bottom of
Appendix Table A indicate only partial recovery on average.
Since government workers display a strong improvement relative to others, we should ex-
pect a relative decrease in Pengajian during this period. I estimate equation 1.5 for wetland
13I am unable to use the panel wave that immediately follows the crisis wave because Pengajian is not recorded
in December 1998.
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hectares and government occupation a year after the crisis. Panel C of Table 3 indicates that
after the crisis, neither the amount of wetland owned nor government occupation is strongly cor-
related with Pengajian change. However, as expected, government workers display a negative
coefficient for Pengajian (Column 5).
1.4.4 2SLS Estimates
In what follows, I use the exhibited pattern of distress to calculate the impact of a dollar of per-
capita nonfood expenditure change on changes in religious intensity. Table 4 estimates equation
1.3 for Pengajian in linear, ordered probit, and probit specifications. Columns 7 suggest a $1
decline in per-capita nonfood expenditure stimulates a 2% increase in likelihood to increase Pen-
gajian. Since the average household suffered a $4.70 decline in per-capita nonfood expenditure
(as noted in Appendix Table A crisis summary statistics), this suggests the average household
became 9% more likely to increase Pengajian due to economic distress. The consistency across
controls suggests remaining omitted variables bias may be small (compare Columns 3 and 4
and Columns 5 and 6). The estimates of the linear probability model displayed in the first row
are very similar to the overall ordered probit marginal effects displayed in the second row.
Importantly, the estimates using wetland hectares and government occupation as separate
instruments are very similar, which acts as an overidentification test (compare Columns 3-4 with
Columns 5-6). Since instrumental variables estimates represent only the change in behavior
for those most affected by the instrument, a priori, one could imagine an estimate based on
government workers might represent only a small fraction of the population and thus be difficult
to generalize. However, a marginal unit of wetland should benefit any household. Since the
treatment effects for two very different populations are so similar, it suggests the estimated
elasticity may be interpreted as one that represents the entire population. Moreover, it may
be the case wetland owners and government workers follow different denominations of Islam.
The overidentification test suggests the result, economic distress stimulates religious intensity,
is invariant to potentially different types of Islam.
Probit marginal effects for increasing (+1 vs. 0/-1) and decreasing (-1 vs. 0/+1) are
displayed in the third row. As the model suggested, when the source of variation is from
hectares of wetland, doing better off causes a decrease in Pengajian, as indicated by Columns
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3 and 4. When the source of variation is from government workers, larger economic distress
causes an increase in Pengajian, as indicated by Columns 5 and 6. The difference between the
marginal effects for increasing and the marginal effects for decreasing are also similar to the
estimates from the linear model in row 1.
1.4.5 Islamic Schools
One other measure of household Islamic activity is provided in the Hundred Villages Survey,
Islamic school attendance. Investigating the impact of economic distress on the number of
children sent to Islamic school serves as further evidence on changes in religious intensity.
Parents typically send children to Islamic school because they want their children to get more
religious education than at a regular school. Under the direction of a Muslim scholar, Islamic
schools are attended by young people seeking a detailed understanding of the Koran, the Arabic
language, the Sharia, and Muslim traditions and history. Students can enter and leave any time
of the year and the studies are not organized as a progression of courses leading to graduation
(LOC 2003, Jay 1969). Geertz (1960) writes of one Koran school, young men ages 6 to 25 spend
part of every day chanting the Koran and part of it working in the leader's fields. Attendance
is not mandatory and there is no fixed schedule as long as he earns his keep and creates no
behavior problems. Children can learn as much or as little as they want. There are no
grades and no classes.14 Returns to schooling at Islamic schools are lower than at non-Islamic
schools (Berman and Stepanyan 2003) and, in my sample, parents report paying substantially
larger fees at Islamic schools than at non-Islamic schools so it would be surprising if households
suffering greater economic distress increase the number of children they send to Islamic school
for economic reasons.
I find that households suffering greater economic distress tend to increase the number of
children sent to Islamic schools and decrease the number of children sent to secular schools.
Only households who send children to school before the crisis are included in the sample, which
reduces the sample size to 4,255 households. Islamic school attendance is defined as the number
of children households send to Islamic schools. Secular school attendance is defined similarly.
14Not all Islamic schools are like this. One translator notes that especially in cities, Islamic schools may be
for the elite, not unlike Catholic schools in some American cities.
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Estimates suggest households who experience a $1 decline in per-capita nonfood expenditures
are roughly 1% more likely to switch a child to Islamic school (Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5
Panel A) and roughly 1% more likely to switch a child from secular schools (Columns 3 and 4 of
Table 5 Panel B). The estimates are not symmetric since households may also take children into
and out of school. Islamic school attendance increases are statistically significant at the 10%
level.15 While only suggestive, this increase seems remarkable since one would expect parents
to send children to less expensive schools, especially those with higher returns to schooling,
during distress.
Islamic schools also become relatively more expensive over the survey time frame: parents
pay a relatively constant 45 cents per month at non-Islamic schools while the fee of Islamic
schools increased from being 35% higher in December 1998 to 80% higher in August 1999.
This increase in Islamic school fees may reflect an increasing demand for Islamic schools. Con-
sistent with an increasing demand, according to a 1992 Library of Congress report (LOC), an
upper bound of 17% of the Muslim school-age population attended Islamic schools in 1992.16
According to IFLS2 conducted in 1997, 18% of Muslim households with children attending
school have sent children to an Islamic school. But according to a nation-wide poll conducted
in 1999, 30% of Muslim households with school-aged children sent their children to a Mosque
school (Wagner 1999). These snapshots of time suggest the financial crisis coincided with a
sharp increase in Islamic school attendance, increasing confidence that a strong form of religious
intensity, not merely religious activity is being captured.
1.4.6 Opportunity Cost of Time
A question that naturally arises is whether Pengajian captures religious intensity or is just
another social activity. Another immediate question is whether Pengajian increases just because
15Identical results are obtained if I run the standard specification, analogous to equation 1.2:
Mijt = ,3Eijt + aot + o'ttXi + bjt + Ui + eijt
for t = 1, 2, i = 1..N, and j = 1..J where Mijt represents the number of children sent to Islamic school (Madrasah)
by household i in village j in time t and per-capita non-food expenditures Eijt are instrumented by ZijPostt.
Postt is a dummy variable indicating whether the time period is after the crisis. Household fixed effects are
represented by ui.
1617% results from dividing 15%, the overall percentage of school-age population attending Islamic school, by
87%, the proportion of the population that is Muslim.
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opportunity cost of time falls (Azzi and Ehrenberg 1975). Suppose C(Q) in equation 1.1 is the
opportunity cost of time. Then as wages fall, religious intensity increases but so do other social
activities and labor supply may decrease.17 On the other hand, the discussion of Proposition 1
suggests economic distress should not stimulate other social activities. In Table 6, I compare
Pengajian with all the other social activities that are surveyed. Column 1 displays the earlier
result (from Column 7 Table 4) that economic distress stimulates Pengajian. Columns 2
through 6 indicate that economic distress does not stimulate participation in any other surveyed
social activity: sports (Olahraga), burial society (Kematian), club for obtaining skills (Karang
Taruna), family welfare movement (PKK and "occasional training for women"), and "10 helps
for housing" (Dasawisma).
The information at the bottom of Table 6 indicates three of the activities are also free,
suggesting their lack of increase is not because of activity fees. Sports, club for learning skills,
and PKK are also available in 83%-96% of villages. In contrast, only 71% of villages have
Islamic chapels and 82% have mosques (83% have Islamic chapels or mosques). So the lack of
increase in other activities is not due to the lack of available facilities.
1.4.7 Labor Supply
Next, to investigate whether Pengajian increases just because people have more leisure, I exam-
ine whether wetland owners supply more labor and government workers supply less labor than
others during the crisis. Table 7 estimates the reduced form analog of equation 1.5. Instead
of regressing
ALij = 'Zij + c + a'Xij + yj + Eij
where ALij indicates labor supply change for household i in village j, I estimate the equivalent
specification:
17'The existing literature often models religious intensity as a function of the opportunity cost of time. Suppose
C(Q) is the opportunity cost of time. Then, the larger is Q, the more forgone earnings, i.e. C'(Q) = f(w) where
f'(.) > 0. As wages w fall, the opportunity cost falls, hence -( Q ) > 0 even if religious intensity provides no
social insurance. Economic distress should stimulate other social activities at least as much as religious intensity.
Suppose further that the opportunity cost of time, C(Q) = Qf(w) = (1 - L)f(w), where L is labor supply.
Then 6 ( L ) < 0, where L. is labor supply for agent x. Economic distress should decrease labor supply.
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Lijt 3'ZijPostt + aot + altXij + 6jt + i + Eijt, for t = 1, 2, i = 1..N, and j = ..J
where Postt is a dummy variable indicating whether the time period is after the crisis, Lijt
indicates labor supply for household i in village j in time t, and ui represents household fixed
effects (the notation is like that of equation 1.2). This specification highlights the overall labor
supply change for the entire population, captured in a0 . Previous regressions are not run this
way because Pengajian data is only available in changes.
The coefficient on Postt in Table 7 indicates all households increased labor supply, as mea-
sured by average household hours worked per week. The magnitudes suggest people coming
out of home to work. This is consistent with Frankenberg et.al's (1999) finding that female em-
ployment increased during the crisis and that a large number of women joined family businesses
(including working on the family farm). In fact, dividing 21 (coefficient on Postt in Column
1) by 7 days/week and multiplying by the average number of working age household members
(4.16 average household size - 1.79 average number of children in school = 2.37) gives just over
7 hours/day increase in labor supply, equivalent to perhaps one woman per household leaving
home production and entering the workforce. Columns 1 and 3 indicate those who were hit
harder by economic distress increased their labor supply relative to others (suggesting a back-
wards bending labor supply), inconsistent with the notion that Pengajian increases because
people have more leisure. With controls, the coefficient for wetland remains significant but not
for government workers.
1.5 Does Religious Intensity Function as Ex-Post Social Insur-
ance?
Sections 3 and 4 establish that economic distress stimulates religious intensity. But neither
decrease in opportunity cost of time nor extra leisure time appear to explain increase in religious
intensity: there is no corresponding increase in any other social activity and labor supply does
not decrease for households more affected by the crisis. In fact, it is not that people on the
margin reduce labor and increase religious intensity but that they increase labor and within
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non-labor allocation, they substitute towards religion.18 Religious intensity functioning as
ex-post social insurance may explain this puzzle. Qualitative evidence of social insurance was
provided in Section 2.1. I now discuss some quantitative evidence that religious intensity
functions as social insurance.
1.5.1 Do Religious Institutions Smooth Consumption Shocks?
Religious intensity during the peak of the crisis appears to alleviate the need for alms or credit in
order to meet basic daily needs. Households that increase participation in Koran study during
the crisis (during the three months previous August 1998) see a 50% reduction in likelihood to
need alms or credit three months later (in December 1998) whereas households that decrease
participation see a 20% reduction in likelihood to need alms or credit three months later. 19
Households that did not participate in Pengajian, are only 5% less likely to need alms or credit
three months later. Since non-participating households display little mean reversion in this
time frame, mean reversion might not explain the differential reduction in needing alms or
credit to meet basic daily needs.20
I also derive from the model a test of consumption smoothing among villagers and examine
its empirical application in the appendix. The model suggests, if religious institutions provide
social insurance, villagers will smooth more of their consumption shocks with each other. Since
religious institutions are measured before the crisis, a test of consumption smoothing among
villagers would examine whether the crisis had a smaller impact on standard deviation in
consumption changes in places where there are more religious institutions. 21 To do this, I
identify an exogenous component of the financial crisis based on the village-level version of
the instrument, Gini coefficient of wetland hectares, and ask whether the exogenous crisis
component interacted with pre-crisis number of worship buildings is negative associated with
l8While the survey does not allow finding out precisely what non-labor activity decreased, that economic
distress reduces TV ownership suggest households suffering economic distress may be watching less television.
19 Households that report constant Koran study during the crisis are 24% less likely to need alms or credit
three months later.
20These relationships are robust to controls and ordered probit specifications.
21 It would be insufficient to examine a household's economic distress as the outcome variable since positive and
negative shocks within a village would average each other out. Households in a village with greater insurance
would have smaller absolute shocks but this would be undetectable in a household-level regression with economic
distress as the outcome variable.
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the impact of the crisis, as measured by standard deviation of consumption shocks. The
derivation and estimation are in the appendix.
1.5.2 Does Religious Intensity Increase Less Where Credit Is Available?
The model suggests religious intensity does not respond to economic distress if alternative forms
of consumption smoothing are available. To investigate this hypothesis, I estimate
AQij = o30AEi + 31(AEijCj) + aoCj + a'1Xij + Tyj + Eij
where Cj represents credit availability in village j and credit availability is defined as having
banks, microfinance institutions, or BRI loan products. The coefficient of the interaction
AEijCj indicates whether the effect of economic distress on religious intensity decreases with
the availability of credit. The coefficient is negative and significant, confirming Proposition 2.
The estimate is robust to specifications with and without controls, displayed in Columns 1 and
2 of Table 8. Dividing 0.30 by 0.37 in Column 2 or 0.32 by 0.35 in Column 3 suggests credit
availability reduces the effect of economic distress on religious intensity by roughly 80%.
To address the possibility credit availability proxies for general economic development, I
also include the interaction of economic distress with number of shops and the interaction of
economic distress with an urban dummy. The standard errors of the coefficients of interest, 0
and ,1, increase (in Column 3) while the magnitudes remain unchanged. This suggests there is
something particular about credit availability, not economic development, that influences how
economic distress stimulates religious intensity. If economic distress is interacted with pre-crisis
poverty levels, measured by own poverty or fraction of poor in the village, estimates suggest
that all groups, not just the poor or those in less developed areas, increase religious intensity
with economic distress (not displayed).
Moreover, Column 7 of Table 6 indicates that economic distress does not stimulate par-
ticipation in another mutual insurance group, rotating savings clubs (Arisan), as the model
suggests. Mean changes are indicated in the third row of Table 6. More people overall re-
ported decreasing rotating savings club participation (Column 7) than reported increasing it,
suggesting mutual insurance groups without strong social sanctions are in fact declining relative
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to Pengajian.
Religious intensity may have also increased most where insurance is lacking. Remarkably,
and perhaps warningly, Pengajian participation rates increased from 47% to 73% from August
1998 to August 1999 where there were no Islamic chapels or mosques. Elsewhere, participation
rates only increased from 64% to 71%.
1.5.3 Alternative Theories to Social Insurance
Does economic distress stimulate religious intensity because of poverty? The model in Section
2 predicts income changes to increase religious intensity but does not predict religious intensity
to necessarily correspond to income levels.22 The data provides some suggestive evidence
this is the case. If religious intensity were strictly pegged to income, as economic conditions
improve after the crisis, religious intensity should decrease. However, Pengajian participation
rates continue to increase from 61% in August 1998 to 71% in August 1999 (Appendix Table A
crisis summary statistics). There is also no relation between Pengajian and monthly per-capita
nonfood expenditures in the cross-section.
Instead, the increase in religious intensity after economic conditions improve is consistent
with a model where agents update their beliefs on the underlying volatility after observing the
crisis. A large shock would increase agents' posterior likelihood of volatile income distributions
and increase expected volatility. There is some suggestive evidence that this occurred. During
the crisis, religious dispersion increased, as indicated by the fact that 9% reported increasing
Pengajian and 9% reported decreasing Pengajian (Appendix Table A). As noted above, after
the crisis, Pengajian participate rates continue to increase during the Hundred Villages Survey
panel, consistent with Pengajian providing some ex-ante insurance and an increase in expected
uncertainty.2 3 Recall too the discussion from Section 4.5 that religious schooling appears to
be increasing in Indonesia overall. In October 1999, Indonesia also elected a Muslim cleric as
22 Religious intensity does not necessarily correspond to income levels if large but not arbitrarily small income
changes stimulate religious intensity. If there are adjustment costs to choosing religious intensity then arbitrarily
small shocks would not affect religious intensity and religious intensity would not necessarily correspond to income
levels.
23 Appendix Table A also indicates that Pengajian participation rates are increasing after the crisis while, in
each subsequent survey wave, more people report decreasing Pengajian than report increasing it, which seems
puzzling. However, households sometimes report "decreasing Pengajian" even if in the previous panel wave they
reported not participating.
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president. And generally, the separation between mosque and state appears to be decreasing:
new federal laws mandate all schools to provide Islamic prayer rooms and all children must be
taught in their respective religion.
Variation in other kinds of distresses such as family deaths (infants) do not increase Pen-
gajian. This suggests economic distress, not just any distress or religious intensity as a form of
solace, is responsible for Pengajian increases. This may seem counter-intuitive to the common
notion that bad times stimulate religious feeling, but there may be a self-selection problem in
reports: the religiously intense may claim non-economic distress stimulates religiosity but the
econometrician does not observe all people who suffer those types of distress.
An alternative explanation for some of these findings is that social activities are luxury
goods and income effects outweigh substitution effects. However, this would imply Koran
study is an inferior good and Islamic schools a Giffen good, since the relative price of Islamic
schools has increased. Moreover, this would not explain the results on alleviation of credit con-
straints or consumption smoothing. Religious intensity being an inferior good is also somewhat
inconsistent with the lack of correlation between income and religious intensity.
One other explanation for some of these findings is redistributive altruism. This would imply
religious institutions smooth permanent as well as temporary shocks. But religious institutions
do not appear associated with lower inequality of consumption, which seems inconsistent with
the notion of altruism that smooths permanent shocks.
The securitization of labor is yet another explanation for many of these findings. Religious
organizations can bond labor, i.e. give money because they can commit to preventing individu-
als from leaving in a future period. Most other organizations cannot, so will not provide money
during crisis. One prediction of this explanation is that labor supply will be less backwards-
bending where there are more religious institutions since those in distress should be better able
to sell future labor to religious organizations. The opposite appears to be the case, labor
supply is more backwards-bending where there are more religious institutions. The difference
is sizeable (more than twice as backwards-bending in places with per-capita number of worship
buildings above the median than below the median) but not statistically significant. More-
over, religion as securitization of labor does not at first glance explain why religious intensity
continues to increase after the crisis.
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Ex-post social insurance is distinct from other commonly-held theories of religious intensity:
that religious intensity is due to poverty, opportunity cost of time, general distress, redistribu-
tive altruism, or solace, or that religious intensity is an inferior good or the securitization
of labor. That poverty does not stimulate fundamentalism is consistent with Krueger and
Maleckova's (2002) finding that poverty does not stimulate terrorism. If intensity of identity is
in fact a channel through which riots and violence occurs, these results are also consistent with
DiPasquale and Glaeser's (1997) finding that poverty does not matter for US riots.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I present a model of religious intensity functioning as ex-post social insurance. I
model religion as a risk-sharing mechanism where people pool their resources and redistribute
the pool according to their relative religious intensities. Agents choose a proportion of income
to put in Pengajian. This proportion represents their religious intensity. The pool is divided
according to how much agents contribute as a fraction of their income. The model has the
empirical implications that those who are hit harder by economic distress will increase their
religious intensity and those who are hit less hard will decrease their religious intensity. The
effect should be mitigated when other forms of credit are available. Strong social sanctions
against relative lack of intensity facilitate the stability of ex-post insurance by deterring agents
who receive positive shocks from leaving, which in turn encourages agents who receive negative
shocks to stay because they can appropriate more of the positive shocks.
Empirically, I demonstrate economic distress stimulates religious intensity by exploiting the
fact that rapid inflation caused relative prices to favor growers of staples, namely rice, and hurt
sticky wage-earners, particularly government employees, whose salaries are set by federal law. I
find that households experiencing a $1 decline in monthly per-capita nonfood expenditures are
2% more likely to increase Koran study and 1% more likely to switch a child to Islamic school.
Moreover, participation in other social activities did not increase while labor supply increased,
which seems inconsistent with an opportunity cost view of religious intensity.
Instead, I find that religious intensity is associated with alleviation of need for alms or
credit to meet basic daily needs during the peak of the crisis. The effect of economic distress
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on religious intensity essentially disappears in places where credit is available. And religious
institutions appear to facilitate consumption smoothing among villagers, suggesting religious
intensity functions as ex-post social insurance.
Religious intensity causes more social violence in regions that are more economically dis-
tressed; alternative social insurance mitigates this effect (Chapter 2). To the extent govern-
ments, international organizations, and NGOs are concerned about ideological extremism, in
particular because it may lead to religious conflict and violence, the results suggest increasing
their role in social insurance may mitigate fundamentalist tendencies. Countries that inordi-
nately depend on natural resources may be subject to greater fluctuations and may find reducing
fundamentalist tendencies to be yet another reason to diversify. If it is the case globalization
increases the risk individuals face, providing insurance against that risk may be important in
preventing ethnic-religious conflicts.24
Social scientists increasingly view group identities like ethnicity as social constructs poten-
tially affected by an individual's environment and economic conditions. Religious intensity
provides a particularly apt context to study group identity as it is probably more of a choice
than ethnicity.25 My model suggests one explanation for why some religions and group iden-
tities replace others. In the long-run competition between social insurance groups, social
insurance with punishment will be relatively successful, especially in a volatile environment.
With volatility, religions with harsher punishment are more stable and successful. As volatility
declines, groups or religions with reduced punishment or violence become relatively successful.
Violence should also be interpreted broadly: the concept of hell common in many religions may
substitute for violence towards non-group members. Variation in doctrine suggests the content
of beliefs may in fact be subject to economic forces more generally.
My results also suggest one explanation for why fiscal and social conservatives come hand-
in-hand.26 The religious right may be against welfare because it would compete away its
24 Miguel (2003) and Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2003) find evidence that economic shocks increase
conflicts.
2 5Other group identities may also provide social insurance. For example, Fryer (2003) models blacks playing
a repeated game to see if in-group members are willing to "watch your back".
2 6Some fundamentalists argue supporting or depending on the welfare state (e.g. unemployment insurance) is
the same as worshipping the government as if it were God. See Jost, et.al (2003) for documentation of correlates
of political conservatism. Their finding that uncertainty aversion is correlated with political conservatism is
also consistent with my model: more risk averse agents with a more concave utility function would find religious
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constituents. 27 I have shown that availability of alternative forms of consumption smoothing
reduces the effect of economic distress on religious intensity and there is some suggestive evi-
dence that religious intensity is lower in places where there is greater public funding, particularly
funding that provides social insurance.
1.7 Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 The structure of this proof is mainly an argument by continuity.
Suppose f(xo) is the incentive to change xo. Consider a change in the environment to f such
that f(xo) > . Then there exists a 6 such that it is still the case f(xo + 6) > O. Therefore,
the optimum in the new environment must be at least +6 different than the optimum x0 in the
old environment (if not, we have proof by contradiction).
It can be immediately observed that agent L chooses a higher level of religious intensity
than agent H, Q* > Q/. It is sufficient to show that UHQH=QL < -ULIQH=QL' whichL ~~~~~~~6UHIQH=QL ' Q 5"-'ULIQH=QLic
follows immediately from examining the derivative of the first term in equation 1.1. Since
H > L, u'[(1-QH)H + ( 1)]{-H + j <u'[(1-QL)L+ -4(j 1)]{-L + .} TheQ ~~Q Q QQ
first term is negative while the second term is positive.
Let A -ULIQH=QL - UHIQH=QL Let E(.) u'[(1 - QL)L + -Q (yj)](-L +
- U'[(1 -QH)H + ( 1 )]{-H + . By continuity, there exist 61, 62, and 63 suchQ~~~~~~~ 
that E(.) QQ= <- E(.), V(QHIQL)IQL=QH+62 < 3, and [C(QL) -IQL=QH IQ=QH~bl <31 ' 6QH QCQL
C(QH)[QL=Q+63 < Let 6 = min(bl,62, 63). Then, -~UHQ < -- ULQL=QH+6.CQ H )]ILQ ATe, 6QH H 6 LIQ=H
Thus, Q* > Q-
To show that crisis increases the dispersion of religious intensity, i.e. 'M (Q-) > 0, it is suf-
ficient to show that [--ULIQ Q£_ M =- 6 UH[Q QM=o] > 0, where Q*M=o denotes the
equilibrium solution when M = 0. Again, the result follows from examining the derivative of the
first term in equation 1.1. Let F(.) ULIQL=Q,M=- UH[QH=QM=O. Since no other
term besides the first in equation 1.1 contains M, F(.) = E(.) M=o,bm bm~- E)QL,=QL.,M=O,QH=QHM=O
intensity, a form of social insurance, to be more valuable.
27I uncover some evidence in the General Social Survey and in the political science literature that self-




which in turn equals {-L + .}-u'[(1l - QL *M= )L+ x)]-{-H + M} M'[(1 -
QHMO)H + (Pl)]. Concave utility implies 6 E(.)Q QM=o Q=QM=o > 0. This re-
sult holds relative to any reference point M = M1, not just M = 0. Intuitively, F(.) represents
the tendency for dispersion of religious intensity to increase. If F(.) > 0, then there is room
either for QL to increase or QH to decrease. This is formally shown in the following.
Let A =-F(.)M=M 2 - F(.)IM=M1 where M2 > M1 and the reference point for F(.) is
M = Ml-that is, consider the equilibrium solution Q*,M=Ml when M = M1. F(.) >
0 implies A > 0 as well. It will be convenient to denote equation 1.1 as U = Tx,x(.) +
T., 2 (.) + T., 3 (.). By continuity, there exist 61L, 6 1H, 6 2L, 62H, 63L, and 63H such that
6-TLp(.)IQ QM M M + --- TLp(.)IQL=Q*M=M +6pLM=M 2 < , where p = 1...3, and
6 TH,p( )IQ,=Q*=M, M 6QTHp(.)IQH=Q* M=M1+6pHM=M2< , where = 1...3. Let
TQ--H H Ml - TQ-H QH "pH,M=M2 6
6 = min( 6 1L, 6 1H, 652L, 6 2H, 6 3L, 653H). Then [ --ULQL=Q =M1 +6M=M 6UHIQ=Q=_,M=Mm]
[QULIQQM=L ,M=M1 - UHIQH=Q M1,M=M 1] > O. Thus IM=M2 > IM=M1
To show social sanctions facilitate the functioning of ex-post insurance, consider the extreme
case when V(.) = 0. It is easy to see the equilibrium QH drops, Q* Iv#o > QiIv=O- If UHIVo
is maximized at Q*Iv70O, then UHIv=o(QH*Ivo) < . Thus there exists a 6 such that
6QHUHIV=O(QH = Q v#o -6 ) < . Therefore Q*Tlvo > Qlv=o.
But equilibrium QL drops as well: Qlv4o > QlIv=O. If ULIV$O is maximized at QIV#o
and Q*Ivso, then 'ULIV=o(QLIvoo, Q*Iv=o) < 0. The only consideration for agent L when
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~QrQ)H -L iclathaQH drops is how it affects income, (1 - QL)L + 'Q(Pl) = L + (QHQL)(HL) It is clear thatH ~~~~~~~~Q (QHf+QL)
for L, the more H participates, the larger is the Pengajian budget and the more L gains from
(QHQL)(H-L)} 2(QHQL.)(H-L)>0Thsteexisparticipating. Formally, 6-{L + } (QQ)-) > . Thus there exists6Q- QL (QH+QL) (QH+QL) 3
a 6 such that UL I v=o(QL = QL Vo - 6, Q v=o) < 0. Therefore QL I VO > QL I V=O.
By continuity, the lower is e-QV(.), then the more QH and QL fall.
Note it cannot be the case QH increases taking into account the decline in QL. If QH
increases then so will QL because H's religious intensity is, in a sense, complementary for L's
religious intensity. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 Consider first the choice of QL. If L can smooth intertemporally
by himself, he can achieve his Pareto frontier without having to pay the Pengajian cost C(QL).
38
The proof follows because both the choice set of L increases and, from inspecting equation 1.1,
we know L was previously at a constrained optimum-L would increase religious intensity QL
more if it weren't for cost C(.). Observe that with credit, L can obtain L-H in every time
period if he chooses. However the amount agent L receives from Pengajian is L + (QHQL)HL)(QH+QL)
L receives the payoff L+H when QQL 2 Examining QH = QL reveals that this canQH+Q£L -2' 2QL-1
never be the case since QL, QH E (0, 1). Thus, with costless credit, one obtains a discrete fall
in Q* when credit is available relative to when credit is not available.
Credit availability affects Q* in a similar fashion: If H can smooth intertemporally by
himself, he can achieve his Pareto frontier without having to pay either the Pengajian cost
C(QH) or the TH,1 cost of providing ex-post insurance for L agents. Moreover, with a discrete
fall in Q, social sanction V(Q ) declines as well, meaning H no longer needs to keep Q* asfl i n.Q, s o i l s n t oH(~ elnsa
high to forestall social sanctions. Both forces tend to decrease Q*. Taking into account the
decline in Q* on TH,1 is a force that tends to increase Q*.
Q* falls further than Q*, because u(.) is concave and C(.) is convex. Consider first
only C(.) relative to u(.) in equation 1.1 when credit becomes available. C(.) is convex so
C(QL) > C(QH). Since u(.) is concave, then U'()1Qj,NOCredit > U(-)IQ;,NOCredit- C(QL)
and uH(.)IQLNoCredit bo h measure L's tendency to reduce QL when credit becomes available.
and U'(.)[Q*,NoCr-edit both measure L's tendency to reduce Q when credit becomes available.
C'(Qi) and U'(.)1Q,,NoCredit measure H's tendency to reduce Q* when credit becomes avail-
able. So clearly Q* will fall further than Q* considering only C(.) and u(.). Considering the
first term in equation 1.1, the decline in QL puts upward pressure on QH while the decline in
QH puts downward pressure on QL, which reinforces credit availability reducing Q* more than
it reduces Q*. (Considering the social sanction term in equation 1.1, a sufficient additional
condition is that C(QL) + U'(.)1Qt,NoCredit > C (QH) + U'(')IQ*,NoCredit + V'(QH).) Then
G(QH )1Credit < (-Q')NCreit- Q.E.D.
1.8 Data Appendix
The empirical analysis draws from The Hundred Villages Survey, collected by the Indonesian
Central Statistics Office. The panel dataset follows 8,140 households from May 1997 to August
1999, beginning before the crisis and continuing in four waves after the crisis (Figure 1). In the
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pre-crisis period, the survey observes 120 randomly selected households in each of 100 commu-
nities. However between 1997 and 1998, the number of village enumeration areas increases from
2 to 3, necessitating a replacement of about 40 randomly selected households per village. The
partial replacement of pre-crisis households is why the panel contains 8,140 instead of 12,000
households. The survey also collects village-level information in the first wave of 1997 and
1998. A more detailed description of the survey questions and variable construction used in the
tables is provided below. The survey is in Indonesian and was translated with the help of two
translators.
Wetland and dryland hectares information is taken from the question that asks for total
area that is owned of each of wetland and dryland. Government occupation is taken from
the question "Status of main job last week" where the choices are: work by ourselves without
other's help, working with other's help from temporary worker, working with permanent worker,
government staff, public staff, private worker, and family worker. Government and public staff
were coded as government worker. In Indonesian, the answer choices for government worker are
"Buruh/karyawan pemerintah" and "Buruh/karyawan BUMN/BUMD". Service occupation is
taken from the question, "Main job during last week," where the choices are agriculture, mining,
industry, electricity, construction, business, transportation, finance, service, and other.
I focus on two outcome measures for APij. One is the response to "In the past 3 months,
has your household increased, decreased, stayed the same, or not participated in the study the
Koran (Pengajian)?" More precisely, the phrase is "Pengajian/kegiatan agarma lainnya," which
translates to religious activity, however my translator says the question would be interpreted
by native Indonesians as specifically referring to Koran study; non-Muslims may interpret the
question as referring to the equivalent in their respective religion. This question is asked after the
crisis and is coded as -1/0/+1. The other is the number of children in the household attending
Islamic school. Islamic school attendance is coded from the following. Individuals older than
5 are asked the question "level of highest education that have ever had", which includes the
responses, elementary, Ibtidaiyah (Islamic), secondary school, Tsanawiyah (Islamic), junior
high/vocational, high school, aliyah (Islamic), diploma I/II, diploma III/Bachelor, and diploma
IV/graduate.
The endogenous regressor, AEij, is measured using per-capita monthly nonfood consump-
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tion expenditure change from May 1997 to August 1998. Monthly nonfood expenditures are ob-
tained from the question "Total non-food expense last month". Dividing this number by house-
hold size gives the per-capita information. Expenditures are normalized to US$ to ease inter-
pretation. Exchange rate data obtained from www.oanda.com. The results are qualitatively the
same using a CPI index, which is obtained from www.bi.go.id/bankindonesia-english/main/statistics.
The controls, X/j, include pre-crisis May 1997 values of: household head characteristics-age,
years of education (1-8 where 8=graduated), gender (1=male, O=female), ever-married (1=mar-
ried, divorced, or widowed, O=not married yet), literate (able to read and write), and follows
media (listened to radio or read newspaper last week); household characteristics-household
size, modernity (Sum of dummy indicators for ownership of stove, radio, television, refrig-
erator, satellite dish, motorbike, and car), dryland hectares, farming dummy, service worker
dummy, last month's per-capita non-food expenditures; village characteristics-urban dummy,
population, area, number of shops per 1000 population; geographic characteristics-dummies for
flat, steep (the excluded topography dummy is slight angle), beach, forest, valley, river terrain
(the excluded geography dummy is other); and fiscal characteristics-INPRES (Presidentially
Instructed Program for Village Assistance, implemented during 1996-1997) funding received
normalized to $ per 1000 population, which divides into funds used for productive economic
effort, for buildings and facilities, for offices and institutions, and for human resources, and total
IDT (another village assistance program) funds received by the household between 1994-1996.
Participation in other social activities is asked alongside the question on Koran study. Each
question follows the same format: "In the past 3 months, has your household increased, de-
creased, stayed the same, or not participated in _?" is coded as -1/0/+1. Same and not
participated are coded as 0. The questions are asked in the following order: Family Welfare
Movement (occasional training for women), a program called 10 helps for housing, a national
club designed for common people with the purpose to obtain useful abilities (like a practical
non-formal school for adults), burial society, sport, Koran study, and savings club (whose meet-
ings are tea parties). Participation in Koran study, savings club, 10 helps for housing, Family
Welfare Movement is free. Participation in sport, burial society, and club to obtain skills re-
quire fees. According to the village-level survey, 92% of villages have sport clubs, 83% have
club for obtaining skills, 96% have Family Welfare Movement organizations, 71% have Islamic
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chapels, and 82% have mosques. Labor supply information is obtained by taking the mean of
each household member's "total hours of any work during last week" and computing the change
of this mean between pre- and post-crisis periods.
Credit availability is defined as having a bank, microfinance institution (response to question
on lembaga keu), or BRI loan product (response to question on kupedes) available in village.
Standard deviation of village shock refers to the standard deviation of individual changes in
non-food expenditures over the crisis. A household is considered as needing alms or credit to
meet basic daily needs if they respond they do not have basic supplies (of "9 basic need") for
next week nor a supply of money, and so in order to get food, they are waiting for package,
(trying to) borrow from someone else, or waiting for someone to give. This information is only
asked after the crisis.
Village-level religiosity measures of per capita number of mosques, Islamic chapels, churches,
Hindu temples, and Buddhist temples are taken from the 1997 PODES data (Potensial Desa/Village
Potential Statistics), which asks for 1996 information. The religiosity measures of per capita
number of Islamic boarding schools, religious schools, and seminaries are taken from 1998
PODES. Since it is unlikely that new religious institutions were built during the crisis, I inter-
pret these as pre-crisis numbers and divide by the 1997 PODES population accordingly (1998
PODES population numbers would be affected by crisis-induced migration).
I use the entire sample of 8,140 households. Appendix Table A presents some descriptive
statistics.
1.9 Appendix: Further Consumption Smoothing Evidence
A test of consumption smoothing among villagers can be derived from the model. In the
model, the crisis causes both H and L to fall to H and L. To be consistent with the notation
in Proposition 1, let the decline for H be MH = H - H and the decline for L be ML = L - L.
The variance of consumption shock is Stdev 2 - (H-?+½(L-j)2 where = This1 '2
simplifies to (H2L)2. So, the standard deviation Stdev = HL. Hence, CrisisStdev(AE 3j)j-
2~ ~~ 2
NonCrisisStdev(AEj)j =H- H-L = [ML - MH]. The LHS variable is therefore the
fall for L minus the fall for H due to the crisis. Recall from the discussion after Proposition-
fall for L minus the fall for H due to the crisis. Recall from the discussion after Proposition
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1 that the model assumes the crisis weakly increases the spread between positive and negative
shocks, i.e. the fall for L is weakly greater than the fall for H. And, as stated then, the data
suggests this is in fact the case: the sample mean of village standard deviation of consumption
shocks is much higher during the crisis than during a non-crisis period. So, [ML - -MH] =
CrisisStdev(AEij)j - NonCrisisStdev(AEij)j _ Y > O.
Consider what happens when religious institutions, measured by worship buildings, are
available. The fall for L is mitigated while the fall for H is exacerbated: H must share some
of their money with L. Thus ML falls while MH rises so Y decreases, so religious institutions
should be expected to reduce the standard deviation of consumption shock that is due to the
financial crisis.
The theory therefore suggests the following reduced form specification:
CrisisStdev(AEij)j - NonCrisisStdev(AEij)j = 3oIj + /3IjSj + a'Sj + a'1Xj + Up + r7jp
where Stdev(AEij)j is constructed by calculating each household's change in monthly per-capita
nonfood consumption expenditures and then computing the village-level standard deviation of
these consumption shocks. CrisisStdev(AEij)j is computed using the consumption shocks
during the financial crisis. NonCrisisStdev(AEij)j is computed using consumption shocks
during the post experiment described earlier. The standard deviation captures consumption
smoothing among villagers. Differencing addresses potential fixed omitted variables associated
with village consumption smoothing. Ij represents the village-level instrument, Gini coeffi-
cient of wetland hectares, Sj represents potential social insurance institutions, total worship
buildings per 1000 population, 1996-97 INPRES (Presidentially Instructed Program for Village
Assistance) funds per 1000 population, and credit availability, Xj represents village and geo-
graphic controls (urban dummy, population, area, number of shops per 1000 population, mean
pre-crisis monthly per-capita non-food expenditures, and dummies for geographic characteris-
tics fat, steep, beach, forest, valley, and river) and rp represents province fixed effects.
This methodology is like finding an exogenous component of the financial crisis based on
the village-level version of the instrument, Gini coefficient of wetland hectares, and asking
whether the exogenous crisis component interacted with pre-crisis number of worship buildings
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is negatively associated with the impact of the crisis, as measured by standard deviation of
consumption shocks. If so, this would suggest worship buildings lower standard deviation of
consumption shock that is due to the financial crisis. Columns 1 and 3 of Appendix Table C
indicate that there is a strong reduced form relationship between Gini coefficient of wetland
owned and the standard deviation of consumption shock due to the financial crisis.
The coefficients of interest, io and 31, are displayed in Columns 2 and 4. The negative
sign on the interaction of the wetland Gini coefficient and worship buildings suggest religious
institutions facilitates consumption smoothing among villagers. The average religious worship
buildings per 1000 population is 3.83 (Appendix Table A village summary statistics). Multiply-
ing 3.83 by the coefficient 7.47 and dividing by 40.58 (Column 2) suggests the average number
of religious worship buildings reduced the effect of the financial crisis on standard deviation of
consumption shock by 70%. Comparing Columns 2 and 4 suggests the relationship is robust
to adding village and geographic controls and province fixed effects. The relationship is not
robust however to using the coefficient of variation or interquartile range of village consumption
changes. This may be because the mean of consumption shocks during the non-crisis period is
very small, and dividing by them makes the non-crisis numbers explode. With these caveats in
mind, these results on consumption smoothing are merely suggestive.
The large positive coefficient on credit availability in Column 4 suggests credit availability
widens the spread of consumption shocks during the financial crisis. The intuition for this
result is that those who lose little, lose even less when credit is available. 2 8 But those who lose
little, lose instead more when their relative gain can be appropriated by those who lose more
in religiously intense places.
2 8Consider what happens when credit is available. The fall for L is still mitigated. But the fall for H may be
mitigated too. That is, ML falls and MH falls, so credit availability should be expected to not reduce as much
as religious institutions do, the standard deviation of consumption shock that is due to the financial crisis.
If MH falls more than ML falls when credit is available, then credit availability may widen the standard
deviation of consumption shock that is due to the financial crisis. This would be the case if H smooths more of
their crisis-shock MH than L smooths of their crisis-shock ML. Therefore, whether credit availability reduces
or widens standard deviation during the crisis is a priori ambiguous.
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Table 5--Impact of Economic Distress on Islamic School Attendance (2SLS)
OLS OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A -- Islamic School Attendance Change
Per-Capita Non-Food 0.000 -0.000 -0.008* -0.010*
Expenditure Change (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.006)
Panel B -- Secular School Attendance Change
Per-Capita Non-Food 0.000 -0.000 -0.005 0.007
Expenditure Change (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.012)
IV N N Both Both
Controls N Y N Y
Fixed Effects N Village N Village
Standard errors are in parantheses. Control variables are Household Head and Household Characteristics listed in Table 2.
Islamic school attendance is defined as the number of children households send to Islamic schools. Only households with
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Table 8--Evidence Suggesting Religious Intensity Functions as Social Insurance: Credit
Pengajian Change in Past 3 Months (Aug 1998)
IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3)
Per-Capita Non-Food Expenditure Change -0.018*** -0.037*** -0.035*
(0.007) (0.014) (0.020)
Per-Capita Non-Food Expenditure Change 0.021*** 0.030** 0.032*
* Credit Availability (0.008) (0.013) (0.019)
Per-Capita Non-Food Expenditure Change 0.037
* Number Shops Per 1000 Pop (0.066)
Per-Capita Non-Food Expenditure Change -0.013
* Urban (0.025)
Controls N Y Y
Fixed Effects N Village Village
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Instruments are wetland ownership, government, and their interaction with credit availability.
Credit Availability is defined as having a Bank, Microfinance, or BRI Loan Product available in Village.
Control variables are Household Head and Household Characteristics listed in Table 2.







Surname Indicates Haj Pilgrimage
Number of Children attending Islamic School
Monthly Per-Capita Food Expenditure, May 1997

























Standard Deviation of Village Consumption Shock
during Crisis (Aug 1998 - May 1997)
Standard Deviation of Village Consumption Shock
Non-Crisis (May 1999 - Dec 1998)
Total Worship Buildings Per 1000 Pop
Religious Schools per 1000 Pop
Seminaries per 1000 Pop
% Pengajian Participation in Village, August 1998
Credit Available
Number Shops Per 1000 Pop
Urban
1996-1997 INPRES Funds in $/1000 Pop
N
Monthly Per-Capita Non-Food Expenditure, Change
Pengajian Participation Rate
Pengajian Increase in Last 3 Months
Pengajian Decrease in Last 3 Months
Crisis Summary Statistics








































Appendix Table B--Correlation of Instruments and Pre-Crisis Religious Intensity
Wetland (ha) Dryland (ha) Government Service
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Household Religious Intensity
Surname Indicates Haj Pilgrimage
Number of Children Attending Islamic School
Number of Adults who Attended Islamic School
Controls
Fixed Effects
Panel B: Village Religious Intensity
Mosques in Village Per 1000 Pop
Islamic Chapels Per 1000 Pop
Churches Per 1000 Pop
Hindu Temples Per 1000 Pop
Buddhist Temples Per 1000 Pop
Islamic Boarding Schools Per 1000 Pop
Religious Schools Per 1000 Pop











































































































Each coefficient represents separate OLS regressions on instrument, conditional on controls and fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses. All controls are pre-crisis May 1997 values.
Controls in Panel A are Household Head and Household Characteristics listed below.
Controls in Panel B are Household Head, Household, Village, Geography, and Fiscal Characteristics listed below. Measures in Panel B
are collected at the village level so the corresponding regressions control for village-level clustering and have province fixed effects.
Household Head Characteristics -- Age, Years of Education (8 = graduated), Gender, Ever-Married, Literate, Follows Media (tv or radio)
Household Characteristics -- Household Size, Modernity (Index of Stove, Radio, TV, Fridge, Satellite Dish, Motorbike, Car),
Farming Dummy, Service Dummy, Dryland Ownership (ha), Pre-Crisis Per-Capita Non-Food Expenditure
Column 2 controls for Wetland Ownership (ha) instead of Dryland Ownership (ha). Ha: hectares
Village Characteristics -- Urban, Population, Size, Number of Shops, Mean Pre-Crisis Per-Capita Non-Food Expenditures
Geography Characteristics -- Flat, Steep, Beach, Forest, Valley, River
Fiscal Characteristics -- 1996-1997 INPRES Funds Per 1000 Pop for Economic Activity, Building and Facilities, Offices and Institutions,
Human Resources, and IDT funds
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Does Religious Intensity Cause
Social Violence?
2.1 Introduction
Whether social violence rises or falls with religious intensity is a subject of much debate. Some
credit religion's role in reducing social violence as a means of keeping potential violent actors off
streets (Berrien and Winship 2003, McRoberts 2003). Others cite religion's role in increasing
social violence as it organizes individuals into potential violent actors (Glaeser 2002). Despite
the enormous policy implications, little is known about the causal relationship between religious
intensity and social violence.
The motivation for these questions is not limited to the obvious policy implications for
violence prevention. Estimating the effect of religious intensity on social violence may shed
some light on the magnitude of the social return to religious intensity. Economists interested
in the costs and benefits of religious intensity have traditionally focused on the private return to
religious intensity (lannaccone 1998). However, researchers have recently started to investigate
whether religious intensity generates costs and benefits beyond the private returns received by
individuals (Barro and McCleary 2002, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2003). Yet little research
has been undertaken to evaluate the potential effect of religious intensity on social violence.
Violence is a negative externality with enormous social costs. Several authors have found
significantly negative impacts of ethnic-religious conflicts on economic outcomes (e.g. Abadie
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and Gardeazabal (2002) and Alesina, et.al (1999)). If religious intensity reduces social violence,
then religious intensity will have social benefits that are not taken into account by individuals.
In this case, the social return to religious intensity may exceed the private return. On the
other hand, if religious intensity raises social violence, the social return to religious intensity
may be less than the private return. There are a number of reasons to believe that religious
intensity will affect social violence. On the one hand, Freeman (1986) finds cross-sectional
evidence suggesting religious intensity reduces crime. On the other hand, the provision of local
public goods such as mutual insurance may lead to violence as a way to internalize positive
externalities and induce group members to contribute more to local public goods provision
(Berman 2003). Given the large social costs of violence, even small reductions in violence
associated with religious intensity may be economically important.
Despite the many reasons to expect a causal link between religious intensity and social
violence, empirical research has not addressed potential reverse causality or omitted variables
bias. The key difficulty in estimating the effect of religious intensity on social violence is
that unobserved characteristics affecting religious intensity are likely to be correlated with
unobservables influencing social violence. The use and availability of religious institutions
across countries is affected by many other institutional factors, and thus is difficult to control
for in a regression. Therefore I exploit variation within one country and across time to identify
the effects of religious intensity. I use Indonesia as the sample country, both for the availability
of detailed microeconomic, religious, and social violence data and for its prominence as the
fourth largest country in the world and its history of ethnic-religious conflict.
This paper studies the relationship between religious intensity and social violence around the
time of the 1997 Indonesian crisis. Between 1997 and 1998, Indonesia's Rupiah fell dramatically
from 2400 to the US dollar to 16000 to the US dollar and the CPI for food increased from
100 to 261. My research design exploits differences in religious intensity across Indonesia
before and during the Indonesian financial crisis. To address reverse causality, I examine the
relationship between religious intensity before the crisis and social violence after the crisis; to
address omitted variables bias, I examine the relationship between religious intensity and social
violence controlling for province and time fixed effects.
I present an analysis of data from the Hundred Villages Survey, a panel of 8,140 households,
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conducted by the Indonesian Census Bureau, and data from the Database on Social Violence
in Indonesia 1990-2001. OLS estimates show a large positive relationship between religious
intensity and social violence. In high religious intensity areas, violence is more likely to arise,
as measured by total number of incidents of social violence as well as number of incidents with
minimum of 1 death. This result holds even after controlling for a large set of village and
environmental characteristics.
Because most religious intensity measures are relatively time-invariant and are pre-crisis
measures and because villages are unlikely to build schools, seminaries, or religious buildings in
anticipation of social violence, reverse causality is an unlikely confound. In fact, the relationship
between pre-crisis measures of religious intensity and social violence largely begins after the
crisis.
In addition, stronger forms of religious intensity, such as religious schools and seminaries,
are more strongly associated with violence than weaker forms, such as Koran study and wor-
ship buildings. Multiplying the estimated coefficients by the mean of the religious intensity
measures sums up to the mean of the violence incidents, suggesting religious intensity may
explain practically all the violence that occurred if we take the vector of religious measures as
exogenous. The R2 of the specifications suggest religious intensity may explain one-third of
the variance of violence that occurred.
Social violence is negatively associated with other social activities. This suggests omitted
variables that are associated with both Koran study groups and "placebo" social activities are
not driving the relationship between religious intensity and social violence.
A fundamental issue in the interpretation of the simple OLS specification is the presence of
fixed unobservable factors that are correlated with religious intensity and social violence across
provinces. To address this potential source of bias, I use longitudinal data on Koran study,
which is tracked over time. By observing the same province over time, I can control for province
and time fixed effects. I find that Koran study remains associated with communal violence
after including province and time fixed effects but is unrelated to state or industrial violence.
This last finding lessens the concern that omitted variables drive changes in both Koran study
and violence since there is something specific about communal violence rather than violence in
general that is associated with Koran study.
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In an effort to explore the mechanism why religious intensity and violence are linked, I esti-
mate models with interaction terms. Religious intensity causes more social violence in regions
that are more economically distressed. The interaction of economic distress and pre-crisis
religious institutions-schools, worship buildings, and seminaries-particularly impacts social vi-
olence. I instrument for economic distress using pre-crisis hectares of wetland ownership and
government occupation following the identification strategy in Chapter 1.
Alternative social insurance mitigates this effect. In particular, the effect of the interaction
of religious intensity and economic distress is stronger when credit is unavailable in the form
of banks, microfinance institutions, or BRI loan products. The point estimates suggest credit
availability reduces the impact by roughly 50%.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents background
on religion and social violence in Indonesia, data, and theory for why religious intensity and
social violence may be linked. Section 3 reports results from cross-sectional and longitudinal
variation in religious intensity and social violence. Section 4 examines the impact of the
interaction of religious intensity and economic distress on social violence. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Religion and Social Violence in Indonesia
Between 1990 and 2001, social violence caused at least 6,208 deaths in Indonesia. The violence
was triggered by the financial crisis of 1997. Millions of people lost their jobs and the proportion
of informal workers to total workers increased. The unemployment rate rose from 4.7% in 1997
to 6.3% in 1999 and the proportion of urban informal workers increased from 39% in 1995 to
46% in 1999 (Irawan, et. al., 2000). The crisis reached a peak in early 1998. The crisis led to
riots and lootings in every province except Bengkulu (Tadjoeddin 2002).
Violence is tracked in the UNSFIR Database on Social Violence in Indonesia 1990-2001
(Tadjoeddin 2002), which contains every incident of social violence reported by the national
news agency, Antara, and the national daily, Kompas. The database tracks property damage
as well as interpersonal violence. Social violence refers to physical acts of destruction, killing,
looting, attacks, burning, clashes, taking hostages, etc., by a group of people. Press policies
differ before and after the crisis, thus my analysis will use cross-sectional as well as time-series
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variation.
Communal violence accounts for 77% of the total deaths due to social violence. Communal
violence is defined as violence between two groups of community, one group being attacked by
the other. State-community violence is violence done by communities protesting against state
institutions, such as the military, the administration, or security officials. Industrial violence is
violence that arises from problems of industrial relations. Communal violence has the widest
regional distribution. It is found in 116 of 295 district/cities and 22 of 26 provinces.
Ethnic, religion, and migration-related violence, is the most severe type of communal vio-
lence, accounting for 68% of total deaths due to communal violence. While both ethnic and
religious violence are coded together (In Indonesia, ethnic groups are usually associated with
a particular religion), at least some of these acts of communal violence are definitely religious
in nature: descriptions in Tadjoeddin (2002) include "killing by evoking black magic shaman"
(a form of voodoo), "mass rage as someone recognized himself as God's messenger", "church
ruined", "immoral location ruined", "man taken hostage by Islam holy warrior", "gambling and
prostitution location destroyed", and "burning of entertainment place". Violence as a result of
difference in political views accounts for only 3.3% of deaths due to communal violence (Table
2). This is defined as violence due to conflicts between and within political parties and their
supporters. Figure 1 indicates that the scale of violence increased sharply in 1998. Tables 1-2
and Figure 1 are in Tadjoeddin (2002).
Since the national media often do not record localized conflicts, the data massively under-
reports levels of conflict. UNSFIR captures 1,093 incidents of conflict and 6,208 deaths from
1990 to 2001. The PODES data (Potensial Desa/Village Potential Statistics) documents 5000
villages as reporting conflicts in 2002 alone (Barron, et. al. 2003).
2.2.1 Theory
Religious intensity as insurance provides a theory for why violence and religious intensity may
be linked. (Chen (2004) shows how religious groups provide social insurance.) Suppose there
are a finite number of agents, N, participating in mutual insurance, each receiving high or low
income shocks over time. Let religious intensity, Q, represent the degree to which someone
participates in mutual insurance, i.e. the fraction of income shock shared with the insurance
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group. The greater is one's religious intensity the more mutual insurance given and received.
Consider the extreme choice of full deviation or non-participation by M < N number of
agents. Let Eh(Q) denote the expected value of social insurance when h individuals participate
at Q level of insurance.
Then EN(Q) -EN-M(Q) is the value to participants of deterring deviation and encouraging
participation by M individuals. Violence increases with Q because EN(Q) - EN -M (Q) > 0.
Intuitively, as Q - 0, the value of deterring deviation also approaches 0. More precisely, at
higher Q, groups set a higher V/(.), so violence will be increasing in relative lack of intensity if
Q > 0, and will increase more sharply, the higher is Q.
High marginal utilities during economic distress increase incentives to enact sanctions.
Credit availability mitigates this effect. With volatility, religions with harsher punishment
or violence are more stable and successful. As volatility declines, benign groups and religions
become relatively successful.
2.2.2 Religion and Economic Data
Household religion and economic data come from The Hundred Villages Survey, collected by
the Indonesian Central Statistics Office. The panel dataset follows 8,140 households from May
1997 to August 1999, beginning before the crisis and continuing in four waves after the crisis
(Figure 2). Religious intensity at the household level is measured using the response to "In the
past 3 months, has your household increased, decreased, stayed the same, or not participated
in the study of Koran (Pengajian)?" This question is asked after the crisis and is coded as 1/0.
Chen (2004) verifies Pengajian actually measures religious intensity by examining its correlation
with other measures of religious intensity, such as Islamic school attendance, Koran ownership,
worshipping, and measures of belief such as answering, "It is up to God," in response to "What
is your ideal number of sons?" as well as religious opposition to contraception use.
Village-level religiosity measures of per capita number of mosques, Islamic chapels, churches,
Hindu temples, and Buddhist temples are taken from the 1997 PODES data (Potensial Desa/Village
Potential Statistics), which asks for 1996 information. The religiosity measures of per capita
number of Islamic boarding schools, religious schools, and seminaries are taken from 1998
PODES. Since it is unlikely that new religious institutions were built during the crisis, I inter-
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pret these as pre-crisis numbers and divide by the 1997 PODES population accordingly (1998
PODES population numbers would be affected by crisis-induced migration).
Since the Hundred Villages Survey does not cover separatist areas such as Aceh, no incident
of separatist violence is included in the following analysis. The Hundred Villages Survey and the
Database on Social Violence overlap for the following eight provinces: Bali, Jawa Barat, Jawa
Timur, Kalimantan Timur, Lampung, Nusa Tenggara Timur, Riau, and Sulawesi Tenggara.
Since violence data is recorded at the province level, province-level clusters are included in
specifications where religious intensity is measured at the village level.
2.3 Estimating the Impact of Religious Intensity on Social Vi-
olence
I examine the relationship between religious intensity recorded in the Hundred Villages Survey
and violence recorded in the Database on Social Violence in Indonesia 1990-2001 (Tadjoeddin
2002).
2.3.1 Cross-Sectional Variation
Table 3 reports OLS estimates of an equation linking social violence and religious intensity. In
particular, the table reports estimates of 3 in the equation:
Vjp = YR jp + a'Xjp + ejp
where Vjp represents all social violence incidents from 1990-2001 or all social violence incidents
with minimum 1 death in village j in province p, Rjp is a vector for village j in province p
representing percentage of Pengajian participation in a village, religious worship buildings per
1000 population, religious schools per 1000 population, and seminaries per 1000 population
and Xjp represents village, geographic, and fiscal control variables (urban dummy, population,
area, number of shops per 1000 population, mean pre-crisis monthly per-capita non-food ex-
penditures, dummies for geographic characteristics flat, steep, beach, forest, valley, and river,
1996-1997 INPRES funds per 1000 population for economic activity, building and facilities,
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offices and institutions, human resources, and IDT, another village assistance program). I
control for province-level clusters since violence is recorded at the province level.
The estimates show a strong association between each measure of religious intensity and
violence. The strong association remains after controlling for village, geographic, and fiscal
characteristics (Columns 2 and 4).
In fact, stronger measures of religious intensity-religious schools and seminaries-are much
more strongly associated with violence. Religious schools per 1000 population and seminaries
per 1000 population are associated with violence at 1% statistical significance in most specifi-
cations (Table 3 Columns 1-4). Percentage of Pengajian participation and worship buildings
per 1000 population are associated with violence at 5% to 10% statistical significance in these
specifications. These results are corroborated by Barron, et. al. (2003) who also find in their
cross-sectional analysis of the 2003 PODES data, higher presence of faith groups is associated
with higher levels of conflict.
In magnitudes, multiplying the coefficient by the mean of the religious intensity measures
sums up to the mean of the violence incidents. Thus, if we take Rip as exogenous, this suggests
religious intensity may explain practically all the violence that occurred in averages. The R2
of the regression displayed in Column 1 is 0.34, suggesting religious intensity may explain one-
third of the variance of violence that occurred. The R2 of the regression displayed in Column
3 is 0.32. Columns 2 and 4 have R2 of 0.49 and 0.48 respectively.
2.3.2 Reverse Causality
A possible explanation for a link between religious intensity and violence is the response of
religious intensity to social violence instead of vice versa. The empirical setup precludes this
possibility because of the fact that most religious intensity measures are relatively time-invariant
and are pre-crisis measures. Since it is unlikely that new religious institutions were built during
the crisis, these measures can be interpreted as pre-crisis numbers. Most violence (96%) occurs
after the crisis (Figure 1). It seems unlikely villages build schools, seminaries, or religious
buildings in anticipation of social violence, so reverse causality is an unlikely confound.
Separately regressing violence year-by-year on pre-crisis religious intensity, with the follow-
ing regression,
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Vjpt = gtRjp + atXj p + Ejpt,
suggests the strong relationship between pre-crisis religious intensity and social violence begins
after the crisis. Estimates are reported in Table 4. For example, the estimates of at in 1993
comparing with 1998 rise from 0.252 to 12.107 for Pengajian participation and 1.449 to 23.659
for seminaries (Columns 1 and 3). Figure 3 Panel A displays the relationship between August
1998 Pengajian participation and year-by-year social violence. Figure 3 Panels B-D display the
relationship between pre-crisis per-capita worship buildings, religious schools, and seminaries,
respectively, and year-by-year social violence. Table 4 and Figure 3 have no information
displayed for 1990-1992 and 1994 because there are no reported incidents of social violence that
overlap with the Hundred Villages Survey in those years.
2.3.3 Other Social Activities
Social violence is negatively associated with other social activities. Table 5 displays separate
partial correlations between social violence and each recorded social activity. While Pengajian
is positively correlated with social violence and statistically significant at the 5% level, social vi-
olence is not significantly associated with any other surveyed social activity: sports (Olahraga),
burial society (Kematian), club for obtaining skills (Karang Taruna), family welfare movement
(PKK and "occasional training for women"), and "10 helps for housing" (Dasawisma).
In fact, the estimates suggest participation in non-religious social activities is negatively
associated with social violence. Each percentage point of Pengajian participation is associated
with 0.39 more incidents of social violence whereas each percentage point in participation in
women's training, housing help, skill learning, or burial societies is associated with 0.30 to
0.50 fewer incidents of social violence. These results are corroborated by Barron et.al (2003)
finding that networks of engagement reduce likelihood of conflict. These results also suggest
omitted variables that are associated with both religious and non-religious social activities are
not driving the relationship between religious intensity and social violence.
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2.3.4 Panel Data
The significant relationship between some measures of religious intensity and social violence
before the crisis suggests some unobserved environmental variables may be correlated with reli-
gious intensity. To address this possibility, I also examine the relationship between Pengajian
participation and social violence controlling for province and time fixed effects. Pengajian
participation is the only measure of religious intensity that is time-varying. Time fixed ef-
fects controls for fixed environmental characteristics such as religious or ethnic diversity across
regions.
To construct the panel of religious intensity and social violence, recall that information
on Pengajian participation is collected for 3-month periods. I match the average Pengajian
participation rate of each province for a 3-month period to the number of incidents of social
violence for the same 3-month period. Since the Hundred Villages Survey collected Pengajian
participation at 3 different times, this gives me 8 provinces and 3 time periods for a total of 24
observations to estimate:
Vpt = Rpt + Kp + Tt + £pt
where Vpt represents incidents of social violence, Rpt represents percentage Pengajian partici-
pation in province p at time t, p are province fixed effects, and rt are time fixed effects. I
show specifications with and without weighting by the number of households in the Hundred
Villages Survey per province.
The estimate of about 4.4 in Column 4 of Panel A in Table 6 indicates Koran study is asso-
ciated with communal violence incidents with minimum 1 death at 10% statistical significance.
The estimate of 5.1 in Column 2 indicates Koran study is positively associated with incidents
of communal violence. The coefficient 4.3 in Column 4 is smaller than the coefficient 11 in
Column 3 of Table 3, one reason for which is that violence is restricted to a 3-month period
here whereas in Table 3, violence was aggregated for 1990-2001. The estimates are roughly the
same with and without population weights (Columns 1 and 3).
Even with controls for fixed effects, omitted variables may be driving changes in both Koran
study and violence. To the extent the economic distress that stimulates Koran study would
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stimulate any kind of social violence, observing the relationship between changes in Koran study
and changes in other types of social violence provides a test of this possibility. When different
types of violence are considered in Panels B and C, the association between Koran study and
other types of violence, state-community and industrial, is weaker, with coefficients of -0.11 and
0.91 respectively. The sum of state-community and industrial violence also is weakly associated
with Koran study. There is not enough variation in state-community and industrial violence
incidents with minimum death to run fixed effects regressions. These findings lessen the
concern that omitted variables drive changes in both Koran study and violence since there is
something specific about communal violence rather than violence in general that is associated
with Koran study.
2.4 The Interaction of Economic Distress and Religious Inten-
sity
The previous section finds that social violence is more likely to arise in areas with greater
religious intensity, particularly in the form of religious infrastructure. Moreover, social violence
increased most quickly where religious intensity also increased quickly. To examine why, I
estimate models with interaction terms. In particular, I examine places where the financial
crisis had more or less economic impact using the identification strategy established in Chapter
1. Rapid inflation during the financial crisis favored growers of staples, particularly rice, and
disfavored sticky wage-earners. Hectares of wetland ownership and government occupation
before the crisis act as instruments for economic distress while hectares of dryland ownership
and service occupation act as placebo instruments.
It does not appear to be the case that the association between religious intensity and social
violence is due to economic distress stimulating both religious intensity and social violence.
First, most measures of religious intensity are collected before the financial crisis. Second,
state and industrial violence do not increase with Koran study increases. And third, there is
no strong relationship between social violence and the instruments for economic distress and
the point estimates are of the opposite sign (not shown).
Instead, it appears that the interaction of pre-existing religious intensity interacted with
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economic distress stimulates social violence. Religious intensity causes more social violence in
regions that are more economically distressed.
2.4.1 Reduced Form Evidence
A key prediction of the ex-post social insurance theory is whether religious intensity is more
strongly linked with social violence in regions that are more economically distressed. To test
this, Table 7 Panel A estimates the following reduced form specification:
V3p = 3oR3p + YIR3pZp + 2Zjp + a'Xp + ejp
where Zjp represents the instruments for village j in province p, where the instruments are the
average hectares of wetland owned in village and percentage of household heads who work in
government. R represents pre-crisis religious intensity for village j in province p, defined as
the sum of standardized per capita religious worship buildings, religious schools, and seminaries.
The coefficient -14.2 in Column 1 indicates that where there was more pre-crisis religious
intensity, the more wetland, which cushioned a village from the crisis because villagers can
grow more rice, the fewer incidents of social violence. The coefficient 94.5 in Column 1 for the
interaction of religious intensity and % government workers indicate villages hit harder by the
crisis, because more villagers had sticky wages, and with more pre-crisis religious intensity saw
more incidents of social violence. A similar pattern holds for incidents with minimum death
(Column 3). These relationships are robust to including village, geographic, and fiscal controls
(Columns 2 and 4).
The average hectares of wetland owned is 0.17 (Appendix Table A) and the fraction of
government workers is 0.06. Multiplying -14.2 by 0.17 gives -2.41 and multiplying 94.5 by 0.06
gives 5.67. This suggests the average hectares of wetland owned reduces the effect of religious
intensity on social violence by roughly 30% (2.41 divided by 8.2 in Row 1 Column 1 of Table
7) while the average fraction of government workers increases the effect of religious intensity on
social violence by roughly 70%. These calculated relative effects are larger for Columns 2-4.
In Panel B of Table 7, I replace Zip with placebo instruments for village j in province p,
the average hectares of dryland owned in village and percentage of household heads who work
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in service occupations. Comparing -4.2 on the religious intensity * dryland interaction with
-14.2 for religious intensity * wetland interaction in Column 1 is consistent with the finding
in Chapter 1 that dryland hectares provide roughly half the cushion that wetland hectares
provide. Comparing 53.1 on religious intensity * service interaction and 94.5 on religious
intensity * government interaction in Column 1 also suggests the placebo instruments display
a much smaller and statistically insignificant effect as compared to the actual instruments.
2.4.2 2SLS Estimates
Table 8 estimates the analogous 2SLS specification:
Vj= 0Rjp + l(RjpAEjp) + 32AEjp + a'Xjp + ejp
where AEjp is the average economic distress for village j in province p, instrumented using Zjp
instruments, average hectares of wetland and percentage of government workers. Rp represents
pre-crisis religious intensity for village j in province p, defined as the sum of standardized per
capita religious worship buildings, religious schools, and seminaries. The coefficient -5.9 in
Column 1 suggests social violence rising mostly through the interaction of pre-crisis religious
infrastructure and economic distress. The average household suffered a $4.70 shock in per
capita nonfood expenditures (Appendix Table A). Multipying -5.9 by $4.7 and adding -5.4, the
coefficient on pre-crisis religious intensity in Column 1, indicates social violence is positively
related with pre-crisis religious intensity at the average economic distress level.
2.4.3 Social Insurance and Social Violence
In this subsection, I consider whether credit availability mitigates social violence. I first find
that in the cross-section, social violence is negatively associated with credit availability, defined
as having banks, microfinance institutions, or BRI loan products. To address the possibility
credit availability proxies for general economic development, I also include an urban dummy
and the number of shops. Incidents of social violence are positively associated with those
characteristics, suggesting there is something particular about credit availability, not economic
development, that influences social violence. These estimates are not statistically significant
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but the interpretation is similar considering incidents with minimum 1 death and after including
controls.
In Table 9, I run the 2SLS specification separately for villages with credit availability (n =
32) and without credit availability (n = 61):
Vjp = f3oRjp + 1 (RjpAEjp) + 32AEjp + a'Xjp + ejp
In other words, I estimate
Vjp = 3oRjp + 31(RjpAEjp) + 32AEjp + 33CjPRjp + 4(CjpRpAEjp) + 35CjpAEjP
+36CjP + aoXjp + a'CjpXjp + &jp
where Cjp represents credit availability in village j and province p and credit availability is de-
fined as having banks, microfinance institutions, or BRI loan products, but display the separate
2SLS specifications for ease of interpretation. Comparing the coefficients on the interaction
of religious intensity and economic distress, -4.2 in Column 1 with -8.4 in Column 2 in Panel
A suggest credit availability reduces the impact by roughly 50%. This ratio remains roughly
the same for incidents with minimum 1 death (Columns 3 and 4) as well as for estimates when
the full set of village, geographic, and fiscal controls are included (Panel B). Note though the
difference between the respective coefficients, i.e. 34, is not statistically significant at the 10%
level.
One alternative explanation to the rise in social violence is that instead of economic distress,
it is the political vacuum created during the crisis that allowed social violence to arise. Note
however that between 1990 and 2001, violence as a result of difference in political views accounts
for only 3.3% of deaths due to communal violence (Table 2). Nor is it that religious institutions
are closer to civic/police institutions (the hypothesis being when these weaken, violence arises).
Greater religious diversity of an area as computed by the Herfindahl index of religious worship
buildings is not strongly associated with pre-crisis religious intensity (the hypothesis being that
religious diversity is necessary for violence). Nor are there fewer incidents of social violence
when there is exactly 1 mosque in the village (the hypothesis being under a single religious
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regime, less violence occurs).
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I present an analysis of data from the Hundred Villages Survey and data from
the Database on Social Violence in Indonesia 1990-2001. OLS estimates show a large positive
relationship between religious intensity and social violence. Because most religious intensity
measures are relatively time-invariant and are pre-crisis measures and because villages are
unlikely to build schools, seminaries, or religious buildings in anticipation of social violence,
reverse causality is unlikely to explain this association. In fact, a strong relationship between
pre-crisis measures of religious intensity and social violence begins after the crisis. In addition,
stronger forms of religious intensity are more strongly associated with violence. To control
for potential omitted variables bias, I use longitudinal data on Koran study, which is tracked
over time. I find that Koran study remains associated with communal violence after including
province and time fixed effects but is unrelated to state or industrial violence.
Shedding light on why religious intensity and social violence are linked, religious intensity
causes more social violence in regions that are more economically distressed. Alternative social
insurance mitigates this effect. To the extent governments, international organizations, and
NGOs are concerned about ideological extremism, in particular because it may lead to religious
conflict and violence, the results here and in Chapter 1 suggest increasing their role in social
insurance may mitigate fundamentalist tendencies. Countries that inordinately depend on
natural resources may be subject to greater fluctuations and may find reducing fundamentalist
tendencies to be yet another reason to diversify. If it is the case globalization increases the
risk individuals face, providing insurance against that risk may be important in preventing
ethnic-religious conflicts. In fact, Miguel (2003) and Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2003)
find evidence that economic shocks increase conflicts.
The results suggest one explanation for why some religions and group identities replace
others. In the long-run competition between social insurance groups, social insurance with
punishment will be relatively successful, especially in a volatile environment. With volatility,
religions with harsher punishment are more stable and successful. As volatility declines, groups
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or religions with reduced punishment or violence become relatively successful.
2.6 Data Appendix
The empirical analysis draws from The Hundred Villages Survey, collected by the Indonesian
Central Statistics Office. The panel dataset follows 8,140 households from May 1997 to August
1999, beginning before the crisis and continuing in four waves after the crisis (Figure 1). In the
pre-crisis period, the survey observes 120 randomly selected households in each of 100 commu-
nities. However between 1997 and 1998, the number of village enumeration areas increases from
2 to 3, necessitating a replacement of about 40 randomly selected households per village. The
partial replacement of pre-crisis households is why the panel contains 8,140 instead of 12,000
households. The survey also collects village-level information in the first wave of 1997 and
1998. A more detailed description of the survey questions and variable construction used in the
tables is provided below. The survey is in Indonesian and was translated with the help of two
translators.
One measure of religious intensity is the response to "In the past 3 months, has your house-
hold increased, decreased, stayed the same, or not participated in the study the Koran (Pen-
gajian)?" More precisely, the phrase is "Pengajian/kegiatan agarma lainnya," which translates
to religious activity, however my translator says the question would be interpreted by native
Indonesians as specifically referring to Koran study; non-Muslims may interpret the question
as referring to the equivalent in their respective religion. This question is asked after the crisis
and is coded as 1/0.
The controls, Xij, include pre-crisis May 1997 values of: village characteristics-urban
dummy, population, area, number of shops per 1000 population; geographic characteristics-
dummies for fat, steep (the excluded topography dummy is slight angle), beach, forest, val-
ley, river terrain (the excluded geography dummy is other); and fiscal characteristics-INPRES
(Presidentially Instructed Program for Village Assistance, implemented during 1996-1997) fund-
ing received normalized to $ per 1000 population, which divides into funds used for productive
economic effort, for buildings and facilities, for offices and institutions, and for human resources,
and total IDT (another village assistance program) funds received by the household between
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1994-1996.
I use the entire sample of 8,140 households. Appendix Table A presents some descriptive
statistics.
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Table --Social Violence by Category, 1990-2001
Number of Number of Incidents Number of Deaths % Death to
Category Incidents with Min 1 Death (minimum value) Total Death
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Communal Violence 465 262 4771 76.9
Separatist Violence 502 369 1370 22.1
State-Community Violence 88 19 59 1.0
Industrial Relations Violence 38 4 8 0.1
Total 1093 654 6208 100
Social Violence data from UN Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery, "Database on Social Violence in Indonesia 1990-2001".
An incident of social violence is recorded if the national news agency, Antara, or the national daily, Kompas, reported an incident
with at least one victim, be it human (casualties or injuries) or material (such as houses, buildings, or vehicles damaged or burned).
96% of the incidents occur between 1998-2001; most are communal violence, defined as social violence between two groups
of community, one group being attacked by the other.
Communal Violence: social violence between two groups of community, one group being attacked by the other.
Separatist Violence: social violence between the state and the people of a certain area because of regional separatism.
State-Community Violence: violence between the state and the community who are expressing protests against state institutions.
Industrial Violence: violence that arises from problems of industrial relations.
(/7w)
Table 2--Communal Violence by Sub-Category, 1990-2001
Deaths Incidents
Sub-Category Number % of Total Number City/District
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ethnic, Religion, and Migration 3230 67.7 233 39
The May 98 Riots 1202 25.2 6 10
Differences in Political Views 156 3.3 79 54
Civil Commotion (Tawuran) 87 1.8 70 28
Issue of'Dukun Santet' 65 1.4 28 17
Competing Resources 16 0.3 16 10
Food Riots 5 0.1 23 22
Other 10 0.2 10 9
Total 4771 100 465 116
Social Violence data from UN Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery, "Database on Social Violence in Indonesia 1990-2001".
An incident of social violence is recorded if the national news agency, Antara, or the national daily, Kompas, reported an incident
with at least one victim, be it human (casualties or injuries) or material (such as houses, buildings, or vehicles damaged or burned).
96% of the incidents occur between 1998-2001; most are communal violence, defined as social violence between two groups
of community, one group being attacked by the other.
Communal Violence: social violence between two groups of community, one group being attacked by the other.
Ethnic, Religion, and Migration: religion propagation related to particular regions and ethnic groups
The May 98 Riots: riots in big cities preceding fall of President Suharto in May 1998
Differences in Political Views: conflicts between and within political parties and their supporters
Civil Commotion (Tawuran): clashes between villages, neighborhoods, or groups
Issue of 'Dukun Santet': killings of people accused of evil magic and witchcraft
Competing Resources: disputes between community groups competing for economic resources
Food Riots: mass riots and lootings for staple foods between January to March 1998
Table 3--Relationship between Religious Intensity and Social Violence
Incidents of Incidents with
Social Violence Minimum 1 Death
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Violence (OLS)
% Pengajian Participation in Village, August 1998 35* 36* 11* 11*
(17) (17) (5) (6)
Religious Worship Buildings Per 1000 Pop 4** 3* 1** 1 *
(2) (2) (0) (0)
Religious Schools Per 1000 Pop 16** 14*** 5* 5***
(7) (4) (2) (1)
Seminaries Per 1000Pop 115*** 101*** 36*** 32***
(18) (25) (6) (8)
R2 0.34 0.49 0.32 0.48
N 93 93 93 93
Controls N Y N Y
Regressions are OLS regressions of 93 villages and include province-level clusters.
Social Violence data from UN Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery, "Database on Social Violence in Indonesia 1990-2001".
An incident of social violence is recorded if the national news agency, Antara, or the national daily, Kompas, reported an incident
with at least one victim, be it human (casualties or injuries) or material (such as houses, buildings, or vehicles damaged or burned).
96% of the incidents occur between 1998-2001; most are communal violence, defined as social violence between two groups
of community, one group being attacked by the other.
Control variables are Village, Geography, and Fiscal Characteristics are listed below.
Village Characteristics -- Urban, Population, Size, Number of Shops Per 1000 Pop, Mean Pre-Crisis Per-Capita Non-Food Expenditures
Geography Characteristics -- Flat, Steep, Beach, Forest, Valley, River
Fiscal Characteristics -- 1996-1997 INPRES Funds Per 1000 Pop for Economic Activity, Building and Facilities, Offices and Institutions,
Human Resources, and IDT funds
Table 4--Relationship between Religious Intensity and Year-by-Year Social Violence
Dependent Variable:
























































































Regressions are OLS regressions of 93 villages and include province-level clusters.
Social Violence data from UN Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery, "Database on Social Violence in Indonesia 1990-2001".
An incident of social violence is recorded if the national news agency, Antara, or the national daily, Kompas, reported an incident
with at least one victim, be it human (casualties or injuries) or material (such as houses, buildings, or vehicles damaged or burned).
96% of the incidents occur between 1998-2001; most are communal violence, defined as social violence between two groups
of community, one group being attacked by the other.
Control variables are Village, Geography, and Fiscal Characteristics are listed below.
Village Characteristics -- Urban, Population, Size, Number of Shops Per 1000 Pop, Mean Pre-Crisis Per-Capita Non-Food Expenditures
Geography Characteristics -- Flat, Steep, Beach, Forest, Valley, River
Fiscal Characteristics -- 1996-1997 INPRES Funds Per 1000 Pop for Economic Activity, Building and Facilities, Offices and Institutions,
Human Resources, and IDT funds
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% Pengajian Participation in Village, August 1998
% Training for Women Participation, August 1998
% 10 Helps for Housing Participation, August 1998
% Club for Skill Learning Participation, August 1998
% Burial Society Participation, August 1998
% Sports Club Participation, August 1998


































Each coefficient represents a separate OLS regression of 93 villages, conditional on controls, and include province-level clusters.
Social Violence data from UN Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery, "Database on Social Violence in Indonesia 1990-2001".
An incident of social violence is recorded if the national news agency, Antara, or the national daily, Kompas, reported an incident
with at least one victim, be it human (casualties or injuries) or material (such as houses, buildings, or vehicles damaged or burned).
96% of the incidents occur between 1998-2001; most are communal violence, defined as social violence between two groups
of community, one group being attacked by the other.
Control variables are Village, Geography, and Fiscal Characteristics are listed below.
Village Characteristics -- Urban, Population, Size, Number of Shops Per 1000 Pop, Mean Pre-Crisis Per-Capita Non-Food Expenditures
Geography Characteristics -- Flat, Steep, Beach, Forest, Valley, River
Fiscal Characteristics -- 1996-1997 INPRES Funds Per 1000 Pop for Economic Activity, Building and Facilities, Offices and Institutions,
Human Resources, and IDT funds
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Table 6--Relationship between Religious Intensity and Social Violence (Panel)
Incidents of Incidents with
Social Violence Minimum 1 Death
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Communal Violence (Fixed Effects)
% Pengajian Participation in Province 4.340 5.107 3.989* 4.348*
(4.598) (5.850) (2.209) (2.335)
Panel B: State-Community Violence
% Pengajian Participation in Province -0.034 -0.108 n/a n/a
(1.090) (1.469)
Panel C: Industrial Violence
% Pengajian Participation in Province 1.190 0.909 n/a n/a
(1.215) (1.311)
Population Weighted N Y N Y
Fixed Effects Province, Time Province, Time Province, Time Province, Time
Regressions are Fixed Effects regressions of 8 provinces in each of 3 time periods, a total of 24 observations,
with province and time fixed effects. Population weights are the number of households per province in the sample.
Each coefficient represents a separate OLS regression of Pengajian Participation Rates for 3-month period on Violence.
Social Violence data from UN Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery, "Database on Social Violence in Indonesia 1990-2001".
An incident of social violence is recorded if the national news agency, Antara, or the national daily, Kompas, reported an incident
with at least one victim, be it human (casualties or injuries) or material (such as houses, buildings, or vehicles damaged or burned).
96% of the incidents occur between 1998-2001; most are communal violence, defined as social violence between two groups
of community, one group being attacked by the other.
Communal Violence: social violence between two groups of community, one group being attacked by the other.
State-Community Violence: violence between the state and the community who are expressing protests against state institutions.
Industrial Violence: violence that arises from problems of industrial relations.
n/a: Too few state-community and industrial violence incidents with minimum 1 death to run fixed effects regressions.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Main Experiment
Pre-Crisis Religious Intensity
Pre-Crisis Religious Intensity * Wetland
Pre-Crisis Religious Intensity * % Govt
Wetland
% Govt
Panel B: Placebo Experiment
Pre-Crisis Religious Intensity
Pre-Crisis Religious Intensity * Dryland
























































































Pre-Crisis Religious Intensity is the sum of standardized Religious Worship Buildings Per 1000 Pop, Religious Schools Per 1000
Pop, and Seminaries Per 1000 Pop. Wetland and Dryland are the average hectares owned in village. Government and Service are the
% of household heads who work in that occupation.
Regressions are OLS regressions of 93 villages and include province-level clusters.
Social Violence data from UN Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery, "Database on Social Violence in Indonesia 1990-2001".
An incident of social violence is recorded if the national news agency, Antara, or the national daily, Kompas, reported an incident
with at least one victim, be it human (casualties or injuries) or material (such as houses, buildings, or vehicles damaged or burned).
96% of the incidents occur between 1998-2001; most are communal violence, defined as social violence between two groups
of community, one group being attacked by the other.
Control variables are Village, Geography, and Fiscal Characteristics are listed below.
Village Characteristics -- Urban, Population, Size, Number of Shops Per 1000 Pop, Mean Pre-Crisis Per-Capita Non-Food Expenditures
Geography Characteristics -- Flat, Steep, Beach, Forest, Valley, River
Fiscal Characteristics -- 1996-1997 INPRES Funds Per 1000 Pop for Economic Activity, Building and Facilities, Offices and Institutions,
Human Resources, and IDT funds
(q 3
Table 8--Relationship Between Social Violence and Pre-Crisis Religious Intensity Interacted with Economic Distress
Incidents of Incidents with
Social Violence Minimum 1 Death
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-Crisis Religious Intensity -5.4* -12.4 -1.6* -3.7
(2.5) (14.5) (0.8) (4.6)
Pre-Crisis Religious Intensity -5.9*** -6.9** -1.8*** -2.2**
* Change in Per Capita Nonfood Expenditure (IV) (1.2) (2.4) (0.4) (0.7)
Change in Per Capita Nonfood Expenditure (IV) -6.6 -8.4 -1.9 -2.7
(4.0) (6.6) (1.3) (2.0)
Controls N Y N Y
Pre-Crisis Religious Intensity is the sum of standardized Religious Worship Buildings Per 1000 Pop, Religious Schools Per 1000
Pop, and Seminaries Per 1000 Pop.
Change in Per Capita Nonfood Expenditure is the difference computed between August 1998 and May 1997.
Regressions are IV regressions of 93 villages and include province-level clusters.
The excluded instruments are wetland, government, and their interactions with pre-crisis religious intensity.
Social Violence data from UN Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery, "Database on Social Violence in Indonesia 1990-2001".
An incident of social violence is recorded if the national news agency, Antara, or the national daily, Kompas, reported an incident
with at least one victim, be it human (casualties or injuries) or material (such as houses, buildings, or vehicles damaged or burned).
96% of the incidents occur between 1998-2001; most are communal violence, defined as social violence between two groups
of community, one group being attacked by the other.
Control variables are Village, Geography, and Fiscal Characteristics are listed below.
Village Characteristics -- Urban, Population, Size, Number of Shops Per 1000 Pop, Mean Pre-Crisis Per-Capita Non-Food Expenditures
Geography Characteristics -- Flat, Steep, Beach, Forest, Valley, River
Fiscal Characteristics -- 1996-1997 INPRES Funds Per 1000 Pop for Economic Activity, Building and Facilities, Offices and Institutions,
Human Resources, and IDT funds
/ i 
Table 9--Evidence Suggesting Social Insurance Mitigates Social Violence
Incidents of Social Violence Incidents with Minimum Death
Credit Available No Credit Credit Available No Credit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: No Controls
Pre-Crisis Religious Intensity -4.2 -3.8 -1.3 -0.7
(2.5) (5.6) (1.0) (1.7)
Pre-Crisis Religious Intensity -4.2** -8.4** -1.3** -2.8**
* Per Capita Nonfood Expenditure Change (IV) (1.5) (2.9) (0.5) (1.0)
Per Capita Nonfood Expenditure Change (IV) -5.8 -11.7 -1.8 -4.0
(5.1) (8.4) (1.6) (2.7)
Panel B: With Controls
Pre-Crisis Religious Intensity -5.8 -38.5 -1.9 -10.7
(4.7) (94.5) (1.3) (26.7)
Pre-Crisis Religious Intensity 4.2** -6.7 -1.5** -2.3
* Per Capita Nonfood Expenditure Change (IV) (1.7) (10.7) (0.6) (3.2)
Per Capita Nonfood Expenditure Change (IV) -1.7 -4.8 -1.4 -1.9
(5.1) (17.4) (1.5) (5.5)
N 32 61 32 61
Pre-Crisis Religious Intensity is the sum of standardized Religious Worship Buildings Per 1000 Pop, Religious Schools Per 1000
Pop, and Seminaries Per 1000 Pop.
Credit Availability is defined as having a Bank, Microfinance, or BRI Loan Product available in village.
Regressions are IV regressions of 93 villages and include province-level clusters.
The excluded instruments are wetland, government, interactions with pre-crisis religious intensity.
Social Violence data from UN Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery, "Database on Social Violence in Indonesia 1990-2001".
An incident of social violence is recorded if the national news agency4ntara, or the national daily,Kompas, reported an incident
with at least one victim, be it human (casualties or injuries) or material (such as houses, buildings, or vehicles damaged or burned).
96% of the incidents occur between 1998-2001; most are communal violence, defined as social violence between two groups
of community, one group being attacked by the other.
Control variables are Village, Geography, and Fiscal Characteristics are listed below.
Village Characteristics -- Urban, Population, Size, Number of Shops Per 1000 Pop, Mean Pre-Crisis Per-Capita Non-Food Expenditures
Geography Characteristics -- Flat, Steep, Beach, Forest, Valley, River
Fiscal Characteristics -- 1996-1997 INPRES Funds Per 1000 Pop for Economic Activity, Building and Facilities, Offices and Institutions,
Human Resources, and IDT funds







Surname Indicates Haj Pilgrimage
Number of Children attending Islamic School
Monthly Per-Capita Food Expenditure, May 1997

























Standard Deviation of Village Consumption Shock
during Crisis (Aug 1998 - May 1997)
Standard Deviation of Village Consumption Shock
Non-Crisis (May 1999 - Dec 1998)
Total Worship Buildings Per 1000 Pop
Religious Schools per 1000 Pop
Seminaries per 1000 Pop
% Pengajian Participation in Village, August 1998
Credit Available
Number Shops Per 1000 Pop
Urban
1996-1997 INPRES Funds in $/1000 Pop
N
Crisis Summary Statistics
1998 Aug 1998 Dec 1999 May 1999 Aug
Monthly Per-Capita Non-Food Expenditure, Change -4.7 1.1 -0.1 0.2
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
Pengajian Participation Rate 61% unavail. 67% 71%
Pengajian Increase in Last 3 Months 9% unavail. 7% 7%
Pengajian Decrease in Last 3 Months 9% unavail. 10% 11%
Violence Summary Statistics
Incidents of Social Violence 34.65
Incidents of Social Violence with Minimum 1 Death
Incidents of Communal Violence
(3 month period)
Incidents of Communal Violence with Minimum 1 Death
(3 month period)
Incidents of State-Community Violence
(3 month period)
Incidents of Industrial Violence
(3 month period)








































Can Countries Reverse Fertility
Decline? Marriage and Babies on
the Pedestal: France 1921-1981
3.1 Introduction
Can nation states increase their citizens' reproductive rates? How can developed countries
best alleviate the coming demographic crisis? Are economic incentives the best way to reverse
fertility decline? Over the next 50 years, people over 65 will account for more than half the adult
population and population will decline in many countries, making old age support programs like
Social Security increasingly untenable and perhaps hampering economic growth or leading to
political unrest. To deal with this, some countries have begun implementing policies designed
to raise fertility. For example, German courts ruled in April 2001 that workers with children
should pay lower premiums into compulsory insurance schemes than workers without children.
In August 2000, Singapore introduced a $1.8 billion plan to encourage fertility including baby
bonus and third child paid maternity leave schemes. In November 2001, Australia announced
a similar plan to boost fertility through tax refunds. Yet little is known about whether such
policies actually work.
After World War II, France implemented a most unusual and regressive tax policy in order
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to reverse fertility decline. In most countries, the number of children is multiplied by a small,
fixed deduction. In France, family incomes were divided by a factor increasing in family size to
obtain a final tax bracket-the tax advantage of having children thus increased with wealth. This
policy is unique in that the monetary incentive for fertility was so large and greatest among the
rich, constituting a potentially large transfer program from the poor to the rich. This policy
lasted for 40 years yet its effects have not been examined.
In the French case, while political rhetoric ostensibly argued family allowances existed to ease
the financial burdens of families, eugenic interest in family allowances was substantial during
this time due to fear of depopulation and increasing relative numbers of those they considered
'bad stock', the poor and uneducated. Communications of the French Eugenic Society reasoned
that since lower-class couples were already having as many children as physically possible, the
class-specificity of the income tax legislation would assure the fittest candidates for parenthood
(Soloway 1990 and Schneider 1990), thus an exercise in eugenic tax policy.
This suggests the primary challenge in isolating the effects of French pronatalist policy
is how to distinguish the effects of the intervention from secular time effects. For example,
eugenic interest in family allowances was growing over this period, a factor that itself may have
increased birth rates among high income groups. The confounding psychological effects of
propaganda accompanying such publicized incentives may affect behavior.
This paper uses differential targeting of economic incentives on various populations pro-
vided by a series of policy changes from 1929 to 1981, the identifying assumption being that
propaganda affects different population segments equally. Having several such policy changes
alleviates the identification problem: even if the assumption fails for one population group, it
is unlikely to fail for all population groups.
My main identification strategy is a differences-in-differences approach that uses the dif-
ferential incentives faced by families with different incomes, particularly incentives faced by
middle and high-income families. Using year-income bracket-family size data cells from Statis-
tiques et Etudes Financieres for 1946-1981, Bulletin de Statistique du Ministere des Finances
for 1938-1945, and Bulletin de Statistique et de Legislation Comparee for 1915-1937, I analyze
the following three policy changes, (1) the 1945 introduction of the family quotient system, (2)
the 1950 removal of the tax penalty on childless couples, and (3) the 1959 removal of a tax
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penalty on singles.
These natural experiments provide a laboratory to test economic theories of fertility. Stan-
dard microeconomic theory is not clear on the effect of changing tax incentives for having
children. On the one hand, the income-substitution theory predicts that if children are normal
goods, reducing the price of children and raising income should increase fertility. On the other
hand, the quality-quantity theory predicts that higher incomes for those already with children
induce families to increase quality and lower the quantity of children. Moreover, the subsidy
for children works by lowering the average and marginal tax rates. Lower marginal tax rates
raise take-home wages, which is also the opportunity cost of time, consequently reducing the
number of children.
A similar logic applies for marriages. An income-substitution theory predicts that if spouses
are normal goods, reducing the price of spouses and raising income should increase the number
of marriages. But the subsidy for spouses also lowers marginal tax rates. Lower marginal
tax rates raise the opportunity cost of time, which may increase the separation rate of existing
marriages.
This unusual tax and fertility policy may also explain the historical puzzle of why fertility
has not fallen as far in France as in other European countries. Fertility by income (Figure 1)
suggests France's efforts at reversing fertility decline were somewhat successful relative to other
countries. Cross-country evidence suggests that social policy, particularly the decline in gov-
ernment subsidies, as a leading explanation for fertility decline or lack thereof (Becker, Glaeser,
Shapiro 2001). This paper finds a large, statistically significant elasticity of fertility and mar-
riage with respect to tax incentives, suggesting the income-substitution mechanism outweighs
the quality-quantity mechanism. I find that if the incentive to have the first child increases
by 1% of income, the average number of dependents increases by 0.09 and the proportion of
families with 1 or more children increases by 4%. If the marriage incentive increases by 10%,
the proportion of married households rises by 3%.
The papers most closely related to this study of the French experience include Milligan
(2002), Kearney (2002), and Whittington, et.al (1990). Milligan (2002) uses variation in
tax policy induced by the introduction of pronatalist transfer policy in Quebec and finds a
strong effect of the policy on fertility. Kearney (2002) uses time and state variation in family
72
cap policies, under which women who conceive a child while receiving cash assistance are not
entitlted to further benefits, and does not find family caps discourage fertility. Using a time
series of the general fertility rate, Whittington, et.al (1990) estimate an elasticity of fertility
with respect to the personal exemption to range from 0.127 to 0.248 in the US. However,
uncontrolled period effects, such as the baby boom, make the analysis difficult to interpret.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the data and empirical
framework. Section 2 discusses changes in French tax policies and presents estimates of the
fertility response to these policies. Section 3 considers the effect of tax incentives on marriage.
Section 4 concludes and discusses directions for further work.
3.2 Data and Empirical Framework
3.2.1 Data
In preface, I attempt to follow the fertility and marriage rates of different percentiles of income
over time. The data sources I have are the following: Statistiques et Etudes Financieres for
1946-1981, Bulletin de Statistique du Ministere des Finances for 1938-1945, and Bulletin de
Statistique et de Legislation Comparee for 1915-1937. The data before and after 1945 appear
in different formats. For each year from 1945-1981, I have 9-14 income brackets. Within each
income bracket, I have the number of households of each family type, a rough proxy for family
size. In other words, I have year-income bracket-family size cells. For each year from 1929-1944,
there are 10-25 income brackets. For these years, information is not broken down by family
size. Only the total number of dependents and the total number of households are available
for each income bracket.
I construct synthetic cohorts to make the data comparable across years by computing the
average fertility of the synthetic cohort. Data in the year-income-size format from 1945-1981
are concatenated into year-income cells in order to match the format for the 1929-1944 data.
That is, I create a weighted average fertility measure for each year-income cell by summing the
product of family size of a year-income-family size cell and the number of households in that
cell divided by the total number of households in the year-income column. This creates 9-25
'prototypical' families per year from 1929 to 1981, representing various income levels as well as
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the number of households each 'prototypical' family represents.
These 'prototypical' families cannot be compared across years, however, because the income
level they represent fluctuates as the income brackets in the data change. Using a time series on
the total number of households, I construct 'hypothetical' households representing particular
income percentiles. Because in the 1920s and 30s as little as 8% of the population actually pays
taxes, I construct 500 'hypothetical' households per year by considering each 0.01% income
percentile from the top 0.01% to the 5th percentile as a separate 'hypothetical' household.
Limiting to the top 5% of population is necessary to alleviate censoring bias that occurs at
the bottom of the income distribution: a family that does not need to pay taxes after the family
quotient is computed will not appear in the tax record. This censoring would cause fertility to
appear lower than it actually is for lower income brackets. As illustration, Figure 2 displays
the average number of dependents per taxable household by income percentile from 1929 to
1981, for households representing the 5th, t , 0.1, and 0.01 percentiles.
For all years, I have tax rules from which I can compute taxes that any family in a year-
income-size cell should pay. Tax rules have small variations every year. Details on the year-to-
year policy variation (Piketty 2001) are summarized in the appendix.
To construct the actual incentive to have the first child, I compute the taxes any income-year
'hypothetical' household would have paid if the household was married with no children and
married with 1 child. The difference is the tax incentive for having the first child. I similarly
construct the tax incentives for having the second and third child and for getting married. All
incentives are computed as percentage of income.
3.2.2 Identification Strategy and Specifications
The ideal experiment would be to randomly assign individuals to have different economic in-
centives for having children. In the absence of such an experiment, I use the differential impact
policy changes have across income percentiles. In particular, I estimate the following reduced
form equations:
Fit ca + - 1(t = 1) + y 1(i E T) + ~- 1(t = 1) x 1(i E T) + eit,
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Iit = a +, - 1(t = 1) + y- 1(i e T) + 71 1(t = 1) x 1(i T) + eit,
where i denotes income percentile rank, t denotes time, Fit denotes a measure of fertility for
income percentile i in time t, and it denotes the tax incentive as percentage of income for
income percentile i in time t. Fit refers to different measures of fertility in the following
discussion so different estimates of /3 will be obtained, but its interpretation should be clear in
the context of each policy change, the timing of which is denoted as t = 1. The treatment
group T is the top 0.01% income percentile for all policy experiments, because this group has
the largest change in fertility incentive as percentage of income. This represents the top two
to three thousand individuals during this time.
I also estimate a continuous treatment specification with the following equation:
Fit a i + 6Iit t + Ei +  it,
where I include fixed effects for income percentile rank, i, to control for unobservables asso-
ciated with income rank and at to remove the time trend. This model uses only time-series
variation within income percentile and cross-sectional variation within years to estimate the
elasticity. I cluster at the income cell level to take into account that the 500 observations per
year are drawn from 9-25 income cells per year.
3.3 The Fertility Response to Tax
3.3.1 1945 Introduction of family quotient system
Beginning in 1920, the French government used the tax code to encourage fertility. At that
time, three tools began to be used to encourage fertility. First, unmarried taxpayers without
children were taxed an extra 25%. Second, married taxpayers without children at the end
of two years of marriage were also taxed an extra 10%. And third, taxpayers with children
received a fixed deduction for each child, with larger per-dependent deductions, the greater the
number of dependents.
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After 1945, the family quotient system computed taxes by dividing the household income
by a family quotient (QF) number, calculating the taxes for households in that income bracket,
and then multiplying back up by the QF number. The QF number assigns each adult 1 unit
and each child 0.5 units; in single-parent households, the first child is counted as 1 unit.
I estimate whether tax incentives had an effect on fertility. The implementation of the
family quotient system appears to have had a positive effect on fertility. Figure 3 focuses on
the years 1935 to 1952, displaying the average number of dependents for households representing
the 5 th, 1 st, 0.1, and 0.01 percentiles. Examining the trends for the 0.1 and 0.01 percentiles
suggest a similar trend in the average number of dependents before 1945, whereas after 1945,
the fertility of the top 0.01% increases relative to the fertility of other income percentiles.
I formally consider this in Table 1. I first show that, as expected under a family quotient
policy, the relative tax incentives for wealthier vs. less wealthy households increases more
for larger nt h dependent than for smaller nt h dependent. Panel B estimates the following
specification:
Iit = a + . 1(t = 1) + -y 1(i T) + 7- 1(t = 1) x 1(i T) + eit,
where i denotes income percentile rank, t denotes time, and Iit denotes the tax incentive as
percentage of income for income percentile i in time t. Comparing 0.021 in the third row of
Column 3 in Panel B and 0.003 in the third row of Column 3 in Panel A indicates a large
differential increase in incentive for the 2nd vs the 1st child for the treatment group. This
basically means the family quotient system has a larger impact for wealthier families for the
second child, as compared to the previous regime. A similar differential increase is found for
the 3rd vs the 1st child by comparing 0.019 in the third row of Column 3 in Panel C and 0.003
in the third row of Column 3 in Panel A.
I then show that wealthier families increased fertility more than less wealthy families in
Panel D by estimating:
Fit = a + -1(t = 1) + y- 1(i E T) + 7- 1(t = 1) x 1(i E T) + eit,
where i denotes income percentile rank, t denotes time, and Fit denotes a measure of fertility
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for income percentile i in time t. As explained earlier, the treatment group T is the top 0.01%
income percentile because this group has the largest change in fertility incentive as percentage
of income. This represents the top two to three thousand individuals during this time period.
The DD estimate of 0.282 displayed in the third row of Column 3 in Panel D is positive and
statistically significant with a standard error of 0.087, suggesting tax incentives increase fertility.
As confirmation, I also show that estimating the actual relationship between tax incentive
and fertility indicates a positive impact. I estimate the following specification:
Fit = a + 3Iit + i + yt + eit,
where I include fixed effects for income percentile rank, i, to control for unobservables associ-
ated with income rank and at to remove the time trend. I cluster to take into account that
the 500 observations per year are drawn from 9-25 income cells per year. Fit represents the
average number of dependents for income percentile i in time t in all specifications.
In Panel E of Table 1, the continuous treatment coefficient of 9.006 in Column 1 of Fit
on the tax incentive for the 1st child suggests that an increase in 1% of the incentive to have
the 1st child increases the average number of dependents by 0.09. The estimates in Columns
2 and 3 suggest increases in the incentive to have the 2nd and 3rd child also increases the
average number of dependents. These results suggest that the quality-quantity mechanism is
outweighed by the income-substitution mechanism. Higher current income has a smaller effect
of lower fertility and reducing the cost of children has a larger effect of raising fertility.
3.3.2 1950 Removal of penalty on childless couples
I consider another policy experiment with the 1950 removal of the tax penalty on childless
couples. The penalty was such that if couples had no children after 3 years of marriage, they
would be assigned a lower family quotient (QF) number of 1.5 rather than 2. This means
their actual tax bracket would be higher than otherwise since dividing the family income by
2 is clearly smaller than dividing the family income by 1.5. After 1950, however, all married
couples without children received a QF of 2 regardless of how long they had been married.
To consider the impact of this policy, it is useful to think about the change in the incentive
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for having the first child. Before 1950, many married couples moved their QF number from
1.5 to 2.5 with the first child (unfortunately the data does not allow determining exactly how
many married couples waited 3 or more years to have their first child). After 1950, the first
child only moved QF numbers from 2 to 2.5.
Removing this penalty on childless couples appears to have reduced fertility. Figure 4
displays the proportion of married households with 1 or more dependents for the top 0.01,
1, and 5% income percentiles. Notice that the fertility measure for the top 0.01% and 1%
trend together before 1950 but after 1950, the proportion of married households with 1 or more
dependents for the top 0.01% falls more than other groups.
As in the previous section, I first show that the policy change affected the tax incentives for
the treatment group more than others. I estimate in Table 2 the following specifications:
it = a +/3. l(t = 1) + .y- 1(i T) + q l(t = 1) x 1(i T) + eit,
Fit= a +,- 1(t = 1) + -y 1(i T) +1. l(t = 1) 1(i E T) + eit,
where i denotes income percentile rank, t denotes time, Fit denotes a measure of fertility for
income percentile i in time t, and it denotes the tax incentive as percentage of income for
income percentile i in time t. Here, Fit refers to the proportion of married households with 1
or more children and Iit denotes the tax incentive for having the 1st child. The first equation
is estimated in Panel A and the second equation is estimated in Panel B. The coefficient -0.029
in the third row of Column 3 in Panel A indicates that the treatment group, the top 0.01%,
faced a larger reduction in tax incentive for having the first child relative to other households
following this policy change.
Then in Panel B, I show that those whose tax incentives were reduced relative to others
were also the ones to show a decline in fertility relative to others. The coefficient -0.115 with
standard error 0.072 in the third row of Column 3 in Panel B suggests tax incentives affect
fertility.
I also estimate in Panel C the following specification:
Fit = a + 3Iit + 6i + Y-t + it,
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where I include fixed effects for income percentile rank, 5i, to control for unobservables associ-
ated with income rank and at removes the time trend, clustering to take into account that the
500 observations per year are drawn from 9-25 income cells per year. The continuous treatment
coefficient of 4.549 in Panel D suggests that an increase of 1% in income through tax incentive
increases the proportion of families with 1 or more kids by a little over 4.5%. These results
are consistent with the income-substitution mechanism.
3.4 The Marriage Response to Tax
3.4.1 1959 Removal of penalty on single-parent households
In this section I now consider the marriage response to tax incentives. In 1959, France further
reduced fertility incentives by removing the tax penalty that singles faced, which reduced the
incentive to be married. Before 1959, the tax penalty was such that single-headed households
without children had a surcharge on their top marginal tax rates. Top marginal rates were
raised to 70, 55, 54, and 48.75 instead of 60, 50, 48, and 45. After 1959, these households have
the same marginal tax rate schedule as other people in their income-QF group, meaning singles
without children had a reduction in the incentive to be married. Because marriage moves a
household from a QF of 1 to 2, the increase in incentive is greatest as a percentage of income
among the wealthiest. However, the policy also raises the opportunity cost of time and so may
lower the probability of marriage.
The results suggest that marriage responds to tax incentives. Figure 5 shows that the
treatment group, the top 0.01%, faced a chaotic trend before 1959 but after 1959 it trended
downwards and became flat in the following 10 years, whereas the control group, the top 1%,
is fat throughout. The 5% income percentile control group is chaotic before 1959 but flat and
higher after 1959.
I formally estimate the following:
Iit = ac + 3. 1(t = 1) + - 1(i E T) + ri- 1(t = 1) x 1(i E T) + it,
Fit= a + -1(t = 1) + y 1(i E T) + 71- 1(t = 1) x 1(i E T) + eit,
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where i denotes income percentile rank, t denotes time, Fit denotes the proportion of married
couples for income percentile i in time t, and it denotes the tax incentive as percentage of
income to be married for income percentile i in time t. The first equation is estimated in Panel
A and the second equation estimated in Panel B. The first row of Column 1 in Panel A of
Table 3 indicates that the marriage incentive drops from 13.4% of income to 2.3% of income
after 1959 for the wealthiest 0.01% of households whereas the control group's marriage incentive
rises from 7.7% to 9.2%. This indicates the treatment group is having a stark reduction in tax
incentive to be married, estimated by the -0.125 coefficient in the third row of Column 3 in the
same panel.
The coefficient of-0.024 and standard error 0.008 in the third row of Column 3 in Panel B
suggests those with greater reduction in the incentive for marriage also became less likely to be
married.
Panel C estimates a continuous treatment specification:
Fit = a + ,3 Iit + 8i + yt + eit,
where i denotes income percentile rank, t denotes time, bi denotes fixed effects for income
percentile rank, and at denotes time fixed effects. I cluster to take into account that the 500
observations per year are drawn from 9-25 income cells per year. The estimate of 0.268 suggests
that an increase in 10% of income by tax incentive raises by 2.68% points the proportion
of married households. These results also suggest that the opportunity cost mechanism is
outweighed by the income-substitution mechanism. Reducing the price of spouses and raising
income increased the number of marriages.
3.5 Conclusions and Further Work
Cross-country time series and fertility by income figures suggest France's efforts at reversing
fertility decline were somewhat successful relative to other countries (Figure 1). Preliminary
micro-evidence presented here indicate a large, statistically significant elasticity of fertility and
marriage with respect to tax incentives, suggesting the income-substitution mechanism out-
weighs the quality-quantity mechanism. I find that if the incentive to have the first child
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increases by 1% of income, the average number of dependents increases by 0.09 and the pro-
portion of families with 1 or more children increases by 4%. If the marriage incentive increases
by 10%, the proportion of married households rises by 3%.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to draw strong conclusions given the lack of detailed data.
Future research should obtain micro or cross-sectional data to use the largest policy change, the
1981 capping of benefits for households above the 90% income level, in a regression-discontinuity
framework. For these incomes, the tax incentive switched from a QF system to a fixed credit
per child, causing many families to jump from the 30% to 60% marginal tax rate.
Micro-data begins in the 1960s. Micro-data would allow controlling for household-level
covariates that may be correlated with fertility. This would reduce omitted variables bias if the
treatment and control groups are not perfectly comparable and reduce standard errors if they are
comparable. The micro-data would also provide exact information on income that would allow
relaxing the consistency assumption that actual population distribution is linearly distributed
within each income cell. Synthetic cohorts would no longer need to be constructed that are
sensitive to income bracket widths and inflation. Micro-data may also provide information on
marriage, which would allow greater precision when applying QF formulas. At present, a QF
of 2.5 can mean either a married couple with 1 child or a single with 2 children. Treatment and
control households further down the income distribution (e.g. 95% vs. 75%) can be used rather
than the present focus on the super rich, whose fertility behavior may be unrepresentative of
the population at large. The data may also allow computing what the French population and
make-up would have been in absence of the tax regime as well as how expensive was this highly
regressive tax policy. Additional caps were also introduced or existing ones were lowered in
1986, 1997, and 1998 for various population subgroups. Belgium, with similar culture and
language, can potentially be used as a control group and France the treatment for a cross-
country comparison.
3.6 Appendix
Piketty (2001) presents details on year-to-year policy variation in tax incentives for fertility.
The data series begins in 1929. The Standard Laws (IGR) are provided in Tables 4-1 to 4-5.
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For years 1915-1918 see Table 4-1, for years 1919-1935 see Table 4-2, for years 1936-1941 see
Table 4-3, for years 1942-1944 see Table 4-4, and for years 1945-1998 see Table 4-5. The tables
simply display income brackets on the left hand column and tax rates on the right hand column.
For tax rates that are displayed as a range, these tax rates are graduated in the range of the
respective income bracket.
Exceptional increases are detailed in Table 4-6. For years 1923-1925 there was an increase
of tax of 20%. For year 1924, an additional increase of 20%. For years 1932-1933, an increase
of 10%. For years 1934-1935, the income bracket 80000-100000 received an extra marginal
rate of 25%; for those incomes above 100k, the marginal rate was an extra 50%. For years
1936-1937, an extra 20% was charged on all whose income are above 20000. For year 1937,
an additional increase of 8%. For years 1938-1940, an increase of 33.33%. For year 1941, an
increase of 50%. For year 1947, an increase of 20% on all whose income is greater than 50000.
For years 1955-1960, an increase of 10% for all whose income > 600000 (6000 of new francs).
For years 1961-1965, an increase of 5%, for all whose income > 6k (in 1961); replaced by 8k (in
1962); replaced by 36k (in 1963); replaced by 45k (in 1964); replaced by 50k (in 1965). For
years 1967 to 1984, the table displays the rest of the exceptional taxes rules.
Family Laws are described in Table C-1. For years 1920-1945, unmarried taxpayers without
children, were taxed an extra 25%. Also for years 1920-1945, taxpayers married without child at
the end of two years of marriage, were taxed an extra 10%. For years 1915-1944, an additional
system of deductions was applied, with the figures in Table C-1 indicated for the nth child.
Note that before 1934, disabled and grandparents also counted as children. From 1936-1939,
deductions only apply fully to those whose income < 75k, while deductions are reduced 20%
for 75k-150k, 40% for 150k-300k, 60% for 300k-600k, and 80% for > 600k. In 1945, there was
a switch from deductions to the QF system, which affects all families, i.e. divide by the QF
number, calculate the tax, and multiply by the QF number, where the QF number is computed
using the rule (single = 1, couple = 2, each child = 0.5). In 1951, the TCF (in which a QF
of 1.5 was assigned to those who are married with no child after 3yrs) penalty was removed.
Changes after 1981 are detailed in Table C-5, not used in the present research but needed for
examining policy changes after 1981.
Finally, there are some miscellanious rules. In 1945, a QF of 2 was assigned to married
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couples which even if not presently having a child by their 3rd year, previously had a child who
is now an adult or deceased provided one of them reached at least 16 years old. In 1945, all
single parents who are unmarried, divorced, or widowed, receive 1 share for their 1st dependent
child, in otherwords, a QF of 2 instead of 1.5. This created an incentive for 2 people to cohabit
and be unmarried, with 1 child each, since they would benefit twice from this whole-share QF
system. In 1945, the "family countervailing charge" was suppressed, which benefited singles
without children (previously there was a 25% surcharge). However, in 1945, singles without
children, having a QF of 1, now have a top marginal rate of 70 instead of 60, and similarly for
all rates down the range, instead of 45, 48, 50, 60, their top rate was 48.75, 54, 55, 70. In 1958,
this rule was removed.
Figure 1 comes from http://www.unl.edu/rhames/courses/social/412-collection/img01.gif.
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Table 1. 1945 Introduction of family quotient system
Panel A: Tax Incentive for 1st child as percent of income
1936-1945 1946-1951 Difference
Top 0.01% 0.058 0.094 0.036
(0.006) (0.029) (0.011)
0.02%-5% 0.008 0.042 0.033
(0.006) (0.020) (0.004)
Difference -0.049 -0.052 0.003
(0.003) (0.011) (0.011)
Panel B: Tax Incentive for 2nd child as percent of income
1936-1945 1946-1951 Difference
Top 0.01% 0.002 0.030 0.028
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
0.02%-5% 0.004 0.011 0.007
(0.004) (0.008) (0.002)
Difference 0.002 -0.019 0.021
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Panel C: Tax Incentive for 3rd child as percent of income
1936-1945 1946-1951 Difference
Top 0.01% 0.002 0.025 0.023
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
0.02%-5% 0.004 0.008 0.004
(0.004) (0.007) (0.002)
Difference 0.002 -0.017 0.019
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Tax incentives for the 1st child are computed by calculating the taxes households
representing the top 0.01% observation would have paid if the household was married with no
children and married with 1 child. The difference is the tax incentive for having the first child.
Tax incentives for having the second and third child are similarly constructed. All incentives
are computed as percentage of income. Incentives are similarly computed for the top 0.02-5%.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Panel D: Average Number of Dependents (Differences-in-Differences)
1936-1945 1946-1951 Difference
Top 0.01% 0.956 1.456 0.500
(0.071) (0.046) (0.030)
0.02%-5% 0.686 0.904 0.218
(0.198) (0.361) (0.082)
Difference -0.270 -0.552 0.282
(0.046) (0.094) (0.087)
Panel E: Average Number of Dependents, 1929-1981 (Continuous Treatment)
Incentive for 1st child 9.006
(0.697)
Incentive for 2nd child 15.957
(4.614)
Incentive for 3rd child 24.642
(5.145)
n 26000 26000 26000
To construct the continuous treatment incentive, the taxes any income-year observation
would pay are computed and differenced for the relevant nth child decision. Regressions
in Panel E are fixed effects regressions with fixed effects for income percentile rank and year.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 2. 1950 Removal of penalty on childless couples
Panel A: Tax Incentive for 1st child as percent of income
1945-1950 1951-1959 Difference
Top 0.01% 0.088 0.045 -0.043
(0.020) (0.040) (0.017)
0.02%-5% 0.038 0.024 -0.014
(0.023) (0.017) (0.006)
Difference -0.049 -0.020 -0.029
(0.011) (0.014) (0.017)
Panel B: Proportion or more children (Differences-in-Differences)
1945-1950 1951-1959 Difference
Top 0.01% 0.610 0.572 -0.037
(0.013) (0.025) (0.011)
0.02%-5% 0.522 0.600 0.078
(0.183) (0.043) (0.058)
Difference -0.087 0.028 -0.115
(0.069) (0.015) (0.072)
Panel C: Proportion 1 or more children, 1929-1981 (Continuous Treatment)
Proportion 1 or more kids
Incentive for 1st child 4.549
(0.975)
n 18000
Tax incentives for the 1st child are computed by calculating the taxes households
representing the top 0.01% observation would have paid if the household was married with no
children and married with 1 child. The difference is the tax incentive for having the first child.
Tax incentives for having the second and third child are similarly constructed. All incentives
are computed as percentage of income. Incentives are similarly computed for the top 0.02-5%.
To construct the continuous treatment incentive, the taxes any income-year observation
would pay are computed and differenced for the relevant nth child decision. Regressions
in Panel C are fixed effects regressions with fixed effects for income percentile rank and year.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 3. 1959 Removal of penalty on singles
Panel A: Tax incentive for marriage as percent of income
1949-1959 1960-1969 Difference
Top 0.01% 0.134 0.023 -0.111
(0.023) (0.012) (0.011)
0.02%-5% 0.077 0.092 0.014
(0.031) (0.032) (0.012)
Difference -0.056 0.068 -0.125
(0.013) (0.009) (0.016)
Tax incentives for marriage are computed by calculating the taxes households
representing the top 0.01% observation would have paid if the household was single
vs. married. The difference is the tax incentive for marriage. All incentives
are computed as percentage of income. Incentives are similarly computed for the top 0.02-5%.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Panel B: Proportion Married (Differences-in-Differences)
1949-1959 1960-1969 Difference
Top 0.01% 0.894 0.876 -0.018
(0.018) (0.005) (0.008)
0.02%-5% 0.914 0.920 0.006
(0.013) (0.006) (0.003)
Difference 0.020 0.044 -0.024
(0.008) (0.002) (0.008)
Panel C: Proportion Married, 1945-1981 (Continuous Treatment)
Incentive for marriage 0.268
(0.092)
n 18000
To construct the continuous treatment incentive, the taxes any income-year observation
would pay are computed and differenced for the marriage decision. Regressions
in Panel C are fixed effects regressions with fixed effects for income percentile rank and year.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
